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I. INTRODUCTION
Shortly after the income tax became a permanent part of the fed-
eral tax landscape in 1913,' Congress added a provision to the Inter-
nal Revenue Code ("the Code"),2 allowing taxpayers to exclude from
© Copyright held by the NEBRASKA LAw REviEw.
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1. Revenue Act of 1913, ch. 16, 38 Stat. 114.
2. All references are to the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, as amended, unless spec-
ified otherwise.
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income "any damages" received "on account of personal injury or sick-
ness."3 Since its enactment, § 104(a)(2) has been the subject of in-
tense scrutiny4 and constant litigation.5 Both the Treasury
3. Revenue Act of 1918, ch. 18, § 213(b)(6), 40 Stat. 1066. This provision reads in
part:
For purposes of this title ... the term gross income (b) Does not include
the following items, which shall be exempt from taxation under this ti-
tie. . .. Amounts received, through accident or health insurance or
under workmen's compensation acts, as compensation for personal inju-
ries or sickness, plus the amount of any damages received whether by
suit or agreement on account of such injuries or sickness...."
Id. Section 213(b)(6) was replaced by § 104(a)(2) of the 1954 recodification of the
Internal Revenue Code:
(a)... [e]xcept in the case of amounts attributable to (and not in excess
of) deductions allowed under section 213 (relating to medical, etc., ex-
penses) for any prior taxable year, gross income does not include ... (2)
the amount of any damages received (whether by suit or agreement) on
account of personal injuries or sickness . . .
I.R.C. § 104(a)(2)(1954).
4. See, e.g., Debra Cohen-Whelan, From Injury to Income: The Taxation of Punitive
Damages 'on Account of" United States v. Schleier, 71 NORE DAME L. REv. 913
(1996); Scott E. Copple, How Many Remedies Make a Tort? The Aftermath of U.S.
v. Burke and its Impact on the Taxability of Discrimination Awards, 14 VA. TAx
REv. 589 (1995); Joseph M. Dodge, Taxes and Torts, 77 CoaRNLiL L. REv. 143
(1992); Leandra L. Gassenheimer, The Excludability of Employment Discrimina-
tion Awards Under Code Section 104(a)(2) After Burke v. United States and Com-
missioner v. Schleier, 28 Aiz. ST. L.J. 315 (1996); Mary L. Heen, An Alternative
Approach to the Taxation of Employment Discrimination Recoveries Under Fed-
eral Civil Rights Statutes: Income From Human Capital, Realization, and Non-
recognition, 72 N.C. L. REV. 549 (1994); Wendy S. Kennedy, The Taxation of
Punitive Damages: Recent Interpretation of the Section 104(a)(2) Exclusion, 16
PAC E L. REv. 111 (1995); Peter J. Rimel, Recovery Under the Age Discrimination
in Employment Act is not Excludable Under 104(a)(2), 23 W. ST. U. L. Rev. 325
(1996); B. Ford Robertson, Commissioner v. Schleier: The Excludability of ADEA
Awards Under Section 104(a)(2) of the Internal Revenue Code, 31 WARE FoREST
L. REv. 557 (1996); Kate Shepard, Application of Section 104(a)(2) to Age Discrim-
ination Recoveries: Commissioner v. Schleier, 49 TAx LAw. 445 (1996); Renee C.
Harvey, Note, Commissioner v. Schleier: An Unfair Interpretation of Section
104(a)(2), 30 U.S.F. L. Rev. 313 (1995).
5. See, e.g., Commissioner v. Schleier, 515 U.S. 323 (1995)(holding that recovery
under ADEA is not excludable from gross income under § 104(a)(2)); United
States v. Burke, 504 U.S. 229 (1992)(holding that awards under Title VII of the
1964 Civil Rights Act are not excludable under § 104(a)(2) because remedies
available under the Act are not compensatory); Threlkeld v. Commissioner, 848
F.2d 81 (6th Cir. 1988)(adopting the Ninth Circuit's analysis in Roemer v. Com-
missioner, 716 F.2d 693 (9th Cir. 1983), and holding that under Tennessee law,
malicious prosecution is a personal tort action and damage recoveries are exclud-
able under § 104(a)(2)); Roemer v. Commissioner, 716 F.2d 693 (9th Cir. 1983)
(holding that defamation is a personal injury and that compensatory and puni-
tive damages awarded under a defamation suit are excludable under § 104(a)(2));
Seay v. Commissioner, 58 T.C. 32 (1972)(holding that payments received in a
damage settlement for "personal embarrassment, mental and physical strain and
injury to health and personal reputation in the community" were "on account of
personal injuries" and as such were excludable under § 104(a)(2) (quotation omit-
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Department and the courts have struggled to determine the scope of
the terms "personal injury" and "any damages." This debate has cen-
tered around two pivotal issues: (1) whether the term "personal inju-
ries" extends to nonphysical injuries, such as dignitary torts and
employment discrimination, and (2) whether the term "any damages"
encompasses the punitive as well as the compensatory portion of a
personal injury award.6
In 1989, Congress seemed to answer both questions when it
amended the personal injury exclusion to provide that punitive dam-
ages awarded for a nonphysical injury are taxable. 7 Beyond answer-
ing this question expressly, many thought Congress had implied that
punitive damages awarded for physical injuries were not taxable.8
Moreover, by amending the statute to limit damages excludable for
nonphysical injuries, Congress made clear its assumption that the
term "personal injury" extended to nonphysical as well as physical in-
juries. The debate, however, was far from over.
ted)); Hawkins v. Commissioner, 6 B.TA_ 1023 (1927)(holding that compensatory
damages received in settlement for injury to personal reputation caused by de-
famatory statements constituting libel or slander were not income), acq. VII-1
C.B. 14 (1928).
6. See, e.g., Jennifer J. S. Brooks, Developing a Theory of Damage Recovery Taxa-
tion, 14 Wzm. MrrcFmL L. REv. 759 (1988)(suggesting that excludability of dam-
age recoveries for injuries, including nonphysical injuries, should be based on the
premise that "income substitutes ought to be includible and substitutes for non-
taxable values ought to be excludible" (quotation omitted)); J. Martin Burke &
Michael K Friel, Tax Treatment of Employment-Related Personal Injury Awards:
The Need for Limits, 50 MoNT. L. Rlv. 13 (1989)(discussing the applicability of
§ 104(a)(2) to payments in settlement, or other resolution, of employment-related
disputes); Paul C. Feinburg, Federal Income Taxation of Punitive Damages
Awarded in Personal Injury Actions, 42 CASE W. REs. L. REv. 339 (1992)(conclud-
ing, after an analysis of the history of § 104(a)(2) and a review of the nature of
various types of damages, that Congress did not intend for punitive damages to
be excludable); Robert R. Wood, Schleier Strikes Taxpayers Three Times, 68 TAX
NoTas 475 (1995)(contending that Schleier implies that the Court will favorably
view the IRS claim that all punitive damages should be taxable).
7. Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1989, Pub. L. No. 101-239, § 7641, 103
Stat. 2106 (1989)(codified at I.R.C. § 104(a)(2) (West Supp. 1992)). This amend-
ment provided in part: "Section 104(a) (relating to compensation for injuries or
sickness) is amended by adding at the end thereof the following new sentence:
'Paragraph (2) shall not apply to any punitive damages in connection with a case
not involving physical injury or physical sickness.'
8. See, e.g., Craig Day, Taxation of Punitive Damages: Interpreting Section
104(a)(2) After the Revenue Reconciliation Act of 1989, 66 WASH. L. Rav. 1019
(1991)(examining the language of the amended statute and the policies leading to
its enactment and proposing that punitive damages be taxed without regard to
the nature of the underlying injury); David G. Jaeger, Taxation of Punitive Dam-
age Awards After the Revenue Reconciliation Act of 1989, 68 TAXEs 368 (1990);
Edward J. Schnee & Jane Evans, Punitive Awards May Be Taxed, But Compensa-
tory Payments Retain Their Tax-Free Status, 18 TAX'N FOR LAw 364 (1990)(dis-
cussing factors the Service considers when examining punitive damages after the
1989 amendment and how this change affects both payers and payees).
1997]
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Twice in the last five years, the Supreme Court limited the applica-
tion of the personal injury exclusion in cases involving nonphysical
injuries.9 In United States v. BurkelO and Commissioner v. Schleier,1
the Court rejected efforts by taxpayers to employ § 104(a)(2) to exclude
amounts received in employment discrimination suits. Additionally,
despite the negative inference of the 1989 amendment, lower courts
continued to debate the exclusion of punitive damages awarded for
physical injuries. 12
On August 20, 1996, President Clinton signed into law the Small
Business Job Protection Act providing tax relief for small business
owners.1 3 The 1996 Act also contained a series of unrelated provisions
designed to provide revenue offsets for the tax relief provided. 14 Sec-
tion 1605 of the Act amended § 104(a)(2) to limit the personal injury
exclusion to cases involving physical injury or physical sickness.15
The new provision, which affects all personal injury judgments and
settlements rendered after August 20, 1996, provides:
SEC. 104 COMPENSATION FOR INJURIES OR SICKNESS
(A) IN GENERAL. - Except in the case of amounts attributable to (and not in
excess of) deductions allowed under section 213 (relating to medical, etc., ex-
penses) for any prior taxable year, gross income does not include
(2) the amount of any damages (other than punitive damages) received
(whether by suit or agreement and whether as lump sums or as periodic
payments) on account of personal physical injuries or physical sickness...
For purposes of paragraph (2), emotional distress shall not be treated as a
physical injury or physical sickness. The preceding sentence shall not apply
to an amount of damages not in excess of the amount paid for medical care
(described in subparagraph (A) or (B) of section 213(d)(1)) attributable to emo-
tional distress. 16
9. Commissioner v. Schleier, 515 U.S. 323 (1995); United States v. Burke, 504 U.S.
229 (1992). See infra notes 163-93 and accompanying text.
10. United States v. Burke, 504 U.S. 229, 229 (1995).
11. Commissioner v. Schleier, 515 U.S. 323, 323 (1995).
12. O'Gilvie v. United States, 66 F.3d 1550 (10th Cir. 1996)(holding that under
§ 104(a)(2)), punitive damages awarded in a products liability action for wrongful
death were not excludable from gross income as damages received "on account of
personal injuries"), aff'd, 117 S. Ct. 452 (1996); Hawkins v. United States, 30
F.3d 1077 (9th Cir. 1994)(holding that noncompensatory punitive damages are
not received "on account of personal injuries" and as such are not excludable from
gross income under § 104(a)(2)), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 2576 (1995); Commis-
sioner v. Miller, 914 F.2d 586 (4th Cir. 1990)(holding that the portion of a settle-
ment in a defamation action attributable to punitive damages was not excludable
from gross income under § 104(a)(2) because punitive damages were a windfall
and therefore not intended to make the taxpayer whole), rev'd, 93 T.C. 330
(1989).
13. Small Business Job Protection Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-188, 110 Stat. 1755.
14. Id. §§ 1601-1633.
15. Id. § 1605(a)(2).
16. Id. § 1605(d)(1).
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As amended, § 104(a)(2) now provides that the personal injury ex-
clusion shall apply only to compensatory damages received on account
of a physical injury or physical sickness.17 Some will undoubtedly ar-
gue that Congress' action resolves once and for all the issues sur-
rounding the personal injury exclusion. However, just as the 1989
amendment did not end the debate, neither does Congress' latest ef-
fort. Old questions have been left unanswered and new ones have
been raised.
For example, the Act leaves unresolved the tax treatment of pre-
enactment awards. The new statute would seem to indicate that com-
pensatory awards for nonphysical injuries and punitive damages
awarded for physical injuries were within the ambit of the prior statu-
tory provision and therefore should be excluded from income. How-
ever, the new Act contains an express refusal by Congress to address
the scope of the prior provision. Indeed, Congress not only declined to
discuss the scope of preenactment § 104(a)(2), it specifically stated
that no inference can be drawn from the new statute when determin-
ing the scope of the prior provision. Therefore, as courts continue to
grapple with the application of preamendment § 104(a)(2) to
thousands of unresolved preenactment settlements and awards, they
must do so without considering the effect of the new statute.
More importantly, however, the 1996 Act raises questions concern-
ing future awards. The line between physical and nonphysical inju-
ries and sickness is more difficult to draw than appears at first glance.
One concern arises out of Congress' attempt to carve out a limited
nonphysical injury exclusion for emotional distress. The language em-
ployed achieves a result far different than intended: instead of provid-
ing a limited nonphysical injury exclusion, the language further
narrows the exclusion for physical injuries. Furthermore, neither the
statute nor the legislative history address the application of the exclu-
sion when physical sickness results from a nonphysical injury.
In addition to the interpretative problems associated with
amended § 104(a)(2), policy considerations also surround the new pro-
vision. In the past, the personal injury exclusion was justified under a
"human capital" rationale.1S In essence, human capital theorists as-
sert that personal injury recoveries represent a return of human capi-
tal and should not be taxed as income. This theory laid the foundation
for the original personal injury exclusion and continues to receive sup-
port today. Now that Congress has limited the personal injury exclu-
17. Id. § 1605(a)(2).
18. One commentator has defined human capital as "a product of birth and social
inheritance [that] is increased by education, health care, migration, and on-the-job training, and is affected by factors such as opportunities and social and tech-
nological changes." Heen, supra note 4, at 550 n.3.
1997]
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sion to physical injuries, this theoretical justification must be
reexamined.
This Article is divided into three parts. Part II reviews the history
of the personal injury exclusion. It finds that, at its inception, the ex-
clusion actually constituted two separate exclusions: a statutory ex-
clusion for physical injuries and a nonstatutory exclusion for
nonphysical injuries. It examines the policy rationale for both exclu-
sions and determines that each resulted from a questionable use of
precedent by early tax policymakers. Eventually, the two exclusions
were merged, first by the courts and then by Congress, as a result of
the 1989 amendment. This historical review leads to two conclusions.
First, if Congress, by amending § 104(a)(2), is stating that the exclu-
sion never was intended to apply to nonphysical injuries, despite the
1989 amendment, then Congress' position is correct and both the Ser-
vice and the courts should reject the extension of § 104(a)(2) to non-
physical injuries in all preenactment cases. Second, and more
importantly, history reveals that the original justification for the
physical injury exclusion was seriously flawed and should have been
rejected by both Congress and the courts.
Part III then examines amended § 104(a)(2) and questions whether
Congress' decision to draw a line between physical and nonphysical
injuries and sickness can be applied sensibly. Congress' attempt to
provide a limited exclusion for the nonphysical injury of emotional dis-
tress creates serious interpretive difficulties that courts are likely to
wrestle with in the near future. Finally, Part IV asks the question:
Did Congress go far enough? It reviews human capital theory and its
recent metamorphosis and suggests that this theory remains a sus-
pect foundation for the personal injury exclusion. Consequently, Part
IV concludes that Congress was wrong; the only appropriate congres-
sional action with respect to § 104(a)(2) was repeal.
II. PART II: A QUESTIONABLE BEGINNING
A. The Physical Injury Exclusion
Although the modern income tax dates from 1913,19 the personal
injury exclusion did not appear in the Code until five years later.20
Prior to this amendment, the Treasury Department decided the tax
treatment of amounts received as reimbursements, awards, or settle-
ments for personal injuries and accidents.
Treasury initially indicated that such amounts were taxable.2 1 In
Treasury Decision 2135, the Department stated that monies received
19. Income Tax Act of 1913, ch. 16, 38 Stat. 114.
20. Revenue Act of 1918, ch. 18, § 213(b)(6), 40 Stat. 1066.
21. T.D. 2135, 17 Treas. Dec. Int. Rev. 39, 42 (1915).
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by a taxpayer under an accident insurance policy were income.22
Although Treasury Decision 2135 did not address personal injury
awards in general, it did contain the following statement: "An amount
received as a result of suit or compromise for 'pain and suffering' is
held to be such income as would be taxable under the provision of law
that includes 'gains or profits and income derived from any source
whatsoever. '"'23 Treasury equated amounts received for pain and suf-
fering with proceeds paid under accident insurance policies.24 Treas-
ury Decision 2135 was silent with respect to the tax treatment of
damages received for anything other than pain and suffering as a re-
sult of a personal injury.25 Nevertheless, the holding of Treasury De-
cision 2135 made clear that the Treasury Department considered all
personal injury damages, compensatory as well as punitive, taxable.
That Treasury regarded these amounts as taxable was confirmed by
the regulations promulgated under the 1916 Act.26 Regulation 33 pro-
vided: "Amount received as the result of a suit or compromise for per-
sonal injury, being similar to the proceeds of accident insurance, is to
be accounted for as income."27 The analogy to accident insurance pro-
ceeds, however, would soon play a pivotal role in Treasury reversing
its position.
The reversal in the tax treatment of personal injury awards began
in 1918 when the Attorney General, responding to a letter from the
Secretary of the Treasury seeking an opinion on the taxation of acci-
dent insurance proceeds, urged Treasury to find such amounts exclud-
able from income.28 The flawed reasoning of the Attorney General's
response must be examined in some detail since it directly resulted in
the statutory enactment of the personal injury exclusion.
In arguing for an exclusion, the Attorney General employed three
1918 Supreme Court decisions, none of which involved personal injury
damages or accident insurance. 29 In each of these cases, Lynch v.
22. Id. This ruling was later extended to payments received by employees under ac-
cident compensation laws. T.D. 2470, 19 Treas. Dec. Int. Rev. 321, 323 (1917).
23. T.D. 2135, 17 Treas. Dec. Int. Rev. 39, 42 (1915)(quoting Income Tax Act of 1939,
ch. 16, § I1(B), 38 Stat. 114).
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Revenue Act of 1916, ch. 463, 39 Stat. 756.
27. Treas. Reg. 33, art. 4 (1918).
28. 31 Op. Atey Gen. 304 (1918).
29. Doyle v. Mitchell Bros. Co., 247 U.S. 179 (1918)(holding that an appreciation in
value that occurred prior to the effective date of the Corporation Tax Act of Au-
gust 5, 1909, ch. 6, § 38, 36 Stat. 112, is not includable income in the computation
of the appropriate tax); Southern Pac. Co. v. Lowe, 247 U.S. 330 (1918)(holding
that dividends amounting to nothing more than a mere paper transaction are not
includable as income attributable to the corporation under the Income Tax Act of
1913's definition of income); Lynch v. Turrish, 247 U.S. 221 (1918)(holding that
increases in the value of market shares that occurred prior to the effective date of
1997]
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Turrish, Southern Pacific Co. v. Lowe, and Doyle v. Mitchell Bros. Co.,
the Court dealt with the difficult transition problem of deciding how
pre-1913 Act increases in corporate asset value, resulting from appre-
ciation and income accumulation, should be treated when distributed
to shareholders after the 1913 Act's effective date. But from a broader
perspective, these cases illustrate the early difficulty courts had in de-
fining income and capital for tax purposes. Unfortunately, due to the
transition context, the question of the proper measurement of capital
for tax purposes became intertwined with notions of value as opposed
to cost.3 0 It was this emphasis on capital measured by value that ena-
bled the Attorney General to construct an exclusion argument in the
personal injury context. 31
The first case contorted by the Attorney General in support of his
opinion was Lynch v. Turrish.32 The taxpayer was a shareholder in a
corporation that bought and sold timber lands.33 Prior to March 1,
1913, the effective date of the new income tax, the assets of the corpo-
ration, and thus the taxpayer's investment, had doubled in value.34 In
early 1914, the corporation sold all of its assets at the March 1, 1913
value and distributed the proceeds to the shareholders.35 The sole
question before the Court was whether the pre-March 1, 1913 appreci-
ation in the value of the taxpayer's stock was income under the new
income tax.36
the Income Tax Act of 1913 are not income; gains or profits of a shareholder are
subject to the tax because the distribution increase represented simply a conver-
sion of an existing investment).
30. Generally, cost is the appropriate measure. For example, I.R.C. § 1012 (West
1997) provides that "[tihe basis of property shall be the cost of such property,
except as otherwise provided . . . ." (emphasis added). There is, however, one
provision linking basis to value. It is provided in I.R.C. § 1014 that the basis of
property transferred upon death shall be determined by the fair market value of
the property as of the date of the decedent's death.
31. 31 Op. Att'y Gen. 304 (1918).
32. 247 U.S. 221 (1918).
33. Id. at 223.
34. Id. The original value of Turrish's stock was $79,975. An increase in the market
value of the timber lands doubled the value of Turrish's stock to $159,950 by
March 1, 1913. At this time Turrish and other stockholders sold options to sell
their stock for twice its par value. The purchasers of the option formed a new
company and, on December 31, 1913, informed the original corporation and its
stockholders that it would buy out the company rather than exercise the option.
The stockholders surrendered their certificates to the new company, received
double the par value of the stock, and the original company ceased to exist.
35. Id. at 224.
36. Id. The Court recognized the complexity of this question, stating that although
the point in the preceeding case "seems a short one," it "has provoked much dis-
cussion on not only the legal but the economic distinction between capital and
income." Id.
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The Court used a two-pronged approach and concluded that the
pre-March 1, 1913 appreciation was not income. 37 The first prong
simply recognized that gains accruing before the 1913 Act's effective
date were exempt:
If increase in value of the lands was income, it had its particular time and
such time must have been within the time of the law to be subject to the law,
that is, it must have been after March 1, 1913. But, according to the fact
admitted, there was no increase after that date and therefore no increase sub-
ject to the law.3 8
Having made this determination, the Court simply could have held for
the taxpayer. Instead, it engaged in a discussion of the nature of in-
come and capital.39 The government had argued that the sale of the
timber assets and the distribution of the proceeds had affected a con-
version of exempt capital into taxable dividends. The Court, however,
rejected this argument, positing that "[m]ere advance in value in no
sense constitutes the gains, profits, or income specified by the statute.
It constitutes and can be treated merely as increase of capital."40
Thus, the Court accepted the concept of capital measured by value
with an exclusion from income.
The Court reached a similar result in Southern Pacific Co. v. Lowe,
a case involving a corporate taxpayer's attempt to exclude dividends
paid to it from a wholly owned corporation.41 Since the earnings that
produced the dividends had accrued prior to March 1, 1913, the Court
found them exempt from taxation. 42 But, in so holding, the Court did
not label the dividends as pre-1913 Act income; rather, the Court
stated that "we are bound to consider accumulations that accrued to a
corporation prior to January 1, 1913, as being capital, not income, for
the purposes of the act."43 For purposes of the case, the term used to
describe the pre-Act earnings was irrelevant as long as the accumula-
tions were considered exempt. However, by once again matching the
term "capital" with "value," the Court provided precedent that would
allow the Attorney General to construct his personal injury
exclusion.44
37. Id. at 226. This two-prong approach was first posited by Judge Sanborn, Circuit
Judge for the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals, in the opinion issued by the court
below in Lynch v. Turrish, 236 F. 653 (8th Cir. 1916). Lynch v. Turrish, 247 U.S.
221 (1918).
38. Lynch v. Turrish, 247 U.S. 221, 229 (1918).
39. Id. at 230.
40. Id. The Court relied on its earlier decision in Gray v. Darlington, 82 U.S. (15
Wall.) 63 (1872).
41. Southern Pac. Co. v. Lowe, 247 U.S. 330 (1918).
42. Id. at 338.
43. Id. at 335.
44. See infra notes 57-71 and accompanying text. The Attorney General also cited a
fourth Supreme Court decision, Lynch v. Hornby, 247 U.S. 339 (1918). This case,
although decided the same day as Turrish and Southern Pacific, reached a differ-
ent result. There the Court found a distribution of the pre-Act earnings taxable.
1997]
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The last decision relied on by the Attorney General, Doyle v. Mitch-
ell Bros. Co.,45 involved the treatment of pretax act earnings under
the 1909 Corporate Excise Tax.46 Enacted as part of the compromise
that ultimately led to the passage of the Sixteenth Amendment,47 the
1909 Act imposed a tax on the annual income of corporations begin-
ning in 1909.48 The issue in Mitchell Bros. Co. was whether the com-
pany's inventory should be valued at its original cost or its December
31, 1908 value in determining the cost of goods sold.49 The company
had acquired the inventory, timber acreage, in 1903 for $20 an acre.50
On December 31, 1908, its fair market value equalled $40 per acre.51
In determining its liability under the 1909 Act, the company deducted
from its gross receipts the December 31, 1908 value of $40 rather than
the purchase price of $20 with respect to the acreage converted during
the 1909 tax year.52
The Commissioner determined that the company should have de-
ducted only $20 per acre, in effect-treating the pre-1909 Act apprecia-
tion as income.53 The Supreme Court held that although increases in
the value of corporate assets were, in general, taxable as income upon
conversion of the assets, pre-1909 Act increments in value were not
taxable.54 Justice Pitney, writing for the majority, stated:
The Court distinguished Turrish as a case involving distributions in complete
liquidation and Southern Pacific as a case involving distributions to a sole share-
holder. Hornby, however, concerned a corporation distributing earnings in the
ordinary course of business. The Court inHornby determined that "all dividends
declared and paid in the ordinary course of business by a corporation to its stock-
holders" after the effective date of the Act (March 1, 1913), were includable as
taxable income. Lynch v. Hornby, 247 U.S. 339, 344 (1918). Thus, whether the
dividends resulted from current earnings or accumulated surplus, they could be
taxed.
45. Doyle v. Mitchell Bros. Co., 247 U.S. 179 (1918).
46. Revenue Act of 1909, ch. 6, § 38, 36 Stat. 112.
47. The Sixteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution, ratified on Febru-
ary 25, 1913, gave Congress the "power to lay and collect taxes on incomes, from
whatever source derived, without apportionment among the several States, and
without regard to any census or enumeration." U.S. CONST. amend. XVI.
President Taft proposed a compromise in an effort to keep the Republican
Party intact. In a letter to the Senate, President Taft suggested that (1) Congress
propose a constitutional amendment enabling it to enact an income tax at a fu-
ture date and (2) Congress enact an excise tax on corporate income. This excise
tax, however, was actually a thinly veiled income tax. Patrick E. Hobbs, Entity
Classification: The One Hundred-Year Debate, 44 CATH. U. L. Rv. 437, 454
(1995). For a discussion of the Excise Tax of 1909 and the ultimate ratification of
the Sixteenth Amendment, see id. at 452-59.
48. Revenue Act of 1909, ch. 6, § 38(3d), 36 Stat. 112.
49. Doyle v. Mitchell Bros. Co., 247 U.S. 179 (1918).
50. Id. at 181.
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 181-82.
54. Id. at 188.
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The matter of income arising from profitable sale of capital assets was
dealt with specifically in such a way as to limit the tax to income arising after
the effective date of the act. This was done by adopting the rule that an ad-
vance in value arising during a period of years should be so adjusted that only
so much as properly was attributable to the time subsequent to January 1,
1909, (December 31, 1908, would have been more precise), should be subjected
to the tax.55
Justice Pitney's language demonstrates the limited application of
the Court's holding that capital recoveries measured by value were
excludable. Value as a measurement was necessitated by the transi-
tion to a new tax regime.
What do Lynch v. Turrish, Southern Pacific Co. v. Lowe, and Doyle
v. Mitchell Bros. Co. have to do with an exclusion from income of acci-
dent insurance proceeds or amounts received on account of personal
injury? Seemingly nothing, and yet, the Attorney General marshaled
them in a way that convinced Treasury to provide an exclusion for
personal injury recoveries.56
The Attorney General's letter to the Secretary of the Treasury, in
response to a request for an opinion, selectively highlighted the por-
tions of the Supreme Court opinions that distinguish capital from in-
come using value as a measure of capital.57 Nowhere, however, does
his letter mention the Court's efforts in these cases to deal with the
transition problem under the 1909 and 1913 Acts. To the contrary,
the letter states that "[tihe principles laid down ... seem general in
their application."5s
Having established this premise, the Attorney General's letter
turned to accident insurance proceeds, noting that both the proceeds
of life insurance policies and the fair market value of gifts and be-
quests were expressly exluded from income. The Attorney General
concluded that this "seems to imply that the property itself is capi-
tal."59 He reasoned that, if life insurance proceeds were properly
characterized as capital and not income, then all insurance proceeds,
55. Id. at 186. That value was used only to properly account for preenactment in-
come is further evidenced by Justice Pitney's reliance on Treasury Regulation 31
(1909), which read:
Sale of capital assets.... [i]f the capital assets were acquired prior to
January 1, 1909, the amount of increment or depreciation representing
the difference between the selling and buying price is to be adjusted so
as to fairly determine the proportion of the loss or gain arising subse-
quent to January 1, 1909, and which proportion shall be deducted from
or added to the gross income for the year in which the sale was made.
Id. at 186 n.1.
56. T.D. 2135, 17 Treas. Dec. Int. Rev. 39 (1915)(ruling, prior to the Attorney Gen-
eral's letter, that personal injury recoveries are taxable income).
57. 31 Op. Atty Gen. 304, 305-07 (1918).
58. Id. at 306.
59. Id.
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including accident insurance, are capital and outside the concept of
income.60
To support this dramatic leap in logic, the Attorney General's let-
ter quotes the following dictum from the Sixth Circuit's opinion in
Doyle v. Mitchell Bros. Co.:
"If an illustration were needed to show that money received from selling capi-
tal assets cannot be 'income', it would be found in the statutory treatment of
insurance money. A loss suffered during the year may be deducted from in-
come, but not so if the loss was compensated by insurance. Fire insurance
money is clearly a substitute for the assets burned; but we find that in the
case of a fire loss uninsured the loss may be deducted from income, while if it
is insured, and if the insurance money is 'income', the loss may not be de-
ducted, and the insurance money must be added-an absurdity which can be
avoided only by saying that such insurance money is not income at all. The
proceeds of the sale of a building or other permanent assets are a§ clearly a
substitute therefor as is the insurance money paid to indemnify for a building
burned."6 1
The Attorney General asserted that if this dictum was correct, then "it
follows that if the proceeds of such accident insurance are held to be
'income', [then] they are in a category different from the proceeds of
any other kind of insurance."62 Thus, the Attorney General concluded
the entire proceeds were excludable regardless of cost.
But, of course, the Sixth Circuit's dictum was incorrect. Even at
this early stage of income taxation it was understood that such casu-
alty insurance proceeds were income, but only to the extent that the
proceeds exceeded the taxpayer's cost in the destroyed property.63 In-
deed, had the Attorney General consulted the Supreme Court's opin-
60. Id. at 307-08. The exclusion for the value of gifts was an early loophole in the
Code, which was closed by. Congress with the passage of the Revenue Act of 1921,
ch. 136, 42 Stat. 227. This change is now found in the first clause of I.R.C.
§ 1015(a). The change was necessary because, under then existing law, the basis
of a gift was its fair market value on the day of acquisition. As noted in the
House Report accompanying the Revenue Bill of 1921:
This rule has been the source of serious evasion and abuse. Taxpayers
having property [that] has come to be worth far more than it cost gave
such property to wives or relatives by whom it may be sold without real-
izing a gain unless the selling price is in excess of the value of the prop-
erty at the time of the gift. The proposed bill in paragraph (2) of
subdivision (a) provides a new and just rule, namely, that in the case of
property acquired by gift after December 31, 1920, the basis for comput-
ing gain or loss shall be the same as the property would have [been] in
the hands of the donor or the last preceding owner by whom it was not
acquired by gift.
H.R. REP. No. 67-350 (1921), reprinted in 1939-1 (Pt. 2) C.B. 168, 175. That the
appreciation in value of gifts was taxable to the donee was confirmed by the
Supreme Court in Taft v. Bowers, 278 U.S. 470 (1929).
61. 31 Op. Att'y Gen. 304, 307-08 (1918)(quoting Doyle v. Mitchell Bros. Co., 235 F.
686, 687 (1916)).
62. Id. at 308.
63. Doyle v. Mitchell Bros. Co., 247 U.S. 179 (1918).
[Vol. 76:51
PERSONAL INJURY EXCLUSION
ion in Doyle v. Mitchell Bros. Co., the relationship between capital and
cost would have been apparent.
Whatever difficulty there may be about a precise and scientific definition of
"income," it imports, as used here, something entirely distinct from principal
or capital either as a subject of taxation or as a measure of the tax; conveying
rather the idea of gain or increase arising from corporate activities. As was
said in Stratton's Independence v. Howbert, 231 U.S. 399, 415... : "Income
may be defined as the gain derived from capital, from labor, or from both
combined."
Understanding the term in this natural and obvious sense, it cannot be
said that a conversion of capital assets invariably produces income. If sold at
less than cost, it produces rather loss or outgo. Nevertheless, in many if not in
most cases there results a gain that properly may be accounted as a part of the
"gross income" received "from all sources"; and by applying to this the author-
ized deductions we arrive at "net income." In order to determine whether
there has been gain or loss, and the amount of the gain if any, we must with-
draw from the gross proceeds an amount sufficient to restore the capital value
that existed at the commencement of the period under consideration.64
The Attorney General should not have been confused by the Coures
reference to "capital value." Read in the context of the Court's effort to
deal with pre-1909 Act increases in the value of the taxpayer's as-
sets,65 the Court's language reflects its understanding that returns of
capital are related to cost.66
The Attorney General, however, failed to see the flaw in the Sixth
Circuit's dictum. Instead, his opinion extends the notion of capital
value replacement to the human body by stating that if fire insurance
proceeds were not income but capital, then there should be no distinc-
tion between insurance proceeds awarded for injury to property and
proceeds awarded for injury to one's person.
In my opinion that act does not make such a distinction, because the proceeds
of an accident insurance policy are not "gains or profits and income" as these
terms are defined by the Supreme Court. Without affirming that the human
body is in a technical sense the "capital" invested in an accident policy, in a
broad, natural sense the proceeds of the policy do but substitute, so far as they
go, capital which is the source of future periodical income. They merely take
the place of capital in human ability which was destroyed by the accident.
They are therefore "capital" as distinguished from "income" receipts.6 7
This human capital argument rests on the principle that if an abil-
ity or function of the human body, which previously allowed the tax-
payer to produce income, is diminished through an accident, then the
proceeds are merely a substitute for that ability or function. There is
simply an involuntary exchange of one income producing asset for an-
other; value is excluded, cost is irrelevant.
64. Id. at 185.
65. See supra notes 46-55 and accompanying text.
66. Doyle v. Mitchell Bros. Co., 247 U.S. 179, 185 (1918).
67. 31 Op. Atey Gen. 304, 308 (1918).
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Although the Attorney General's human capital approach to acci-
dent recoveries may have had merit in the abstract, the theory was
unsupported by existing tax doctrine. It was clearly established that a
person's capital was measured by his dollar investment or cost.68 The
cost to the owner of "human capital" is zero, and therefore any insur-
ance or recovery for injury would result in income-a recognition of an
amount in excess of cost. This logic was blurred by the Supreme Court
cases cited by the Attorney General-Lynch v. Turrish, Southern Pa-
cific Co. v. Lowe, and Doyle v. Mitchell Bros. Co. -by linking the mea-
sure of capital to value in the context of deciding the tax treatment of
pre-1909 Act and 1913 Act accumulations of income. 69 There was no
reason to believe in 1918 that "cost" had disappeared as a basis for
computing post-1909 income when capital was sold or converted.
Seduced by the flawed reasoning in the Attorney General's letter,
Treasury adopted the Attorney General's approach to accident pro-
ceeds when it issued Treasury Decision 2747.70 Without exploring the
Attorney General's rationale, Treasury Decision 2747 states as
follows:
The Attorney General has advised, upon the basis of recent decisions of the
Supreme Court (Doyle v. Mitchell Bros. Co., decided May 20 last, Lynch v.
Hornby, Lynch v. Turrish, and Southern Pacific Co. v. Lowe, decided June 3
last), and it is accordingly held, that the proceeds of an accident insurance
policy received by an individual on account of personal injuries sustained by
him through accident are not income .... 71
Having accepted the Attorney General's opinion, Treasury took the
analogy one step further: "[ilt is held upon similar principles that an
amount received by an individual as a result of a suit or compromise
for personal injuries sustained by him through accident is not income
taxable under the provisions of said titles."72 The extension to per-
sonal injuries in general certainly made sense given the treatment of
accident insurance proceeds. It would have been inconsistent to allow
an exclusion for personal injuries compensated by insurance and not
those compensated through litigation.
In 1918, Congress codified the exclusion when it added § 213(b)(6)
to the Internal Revenue Code.73 The new statute provided that in-
come does not include "[a]mounts received, through accident or health
insurance or under workmen's compensation acts, as compensation for
personal injuries or sickness, plus the amount of any damages re-
68. See supra notes 63-64 and accompanying text.
69. See supra notes 32-67 and accompanying text.
70. T.D. 2747, 20 Treas. Dec. Int. Rev. 457 (1918).
71. Id. at 457 (emphasis in original).
72. Id. Thus, the Service revoked the position Treasury had previously held in Regu-
lation 33 when it declared personal injury recoveries and settlements taxable.
Treas. Reg. 33, art. 4 (1918).
73. Revenue Act of 1918, ch. 18, § 213(b)(6), 40 Stat. 1057, 1066.
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ceived whether by suit or agreement on account of such injuries or
sickness." 74 It is clear from the single paragraph of legislative history
accompanying the provision that Congress was simply incorporating
into the Code the Treasury's treatment of such amounts:
Under the present law it is doubtful whether amounts received through acci-
dent or health insurance, or under workmen's compensation acts, as compen-
sation for personal injury or sickness, and damages received on account of
such injuries or sickness, are required to be included in gross income. The
proposed bill provides that such amounts shall not be included in gross
income.7 5
There was no debate and no floor discussion, just this brief statement
that such amounts are probably not income.76
It is no accident that a provision destined to confuse the courts over
the next eight decades was enacted in such summary fashion. If Con-
gress had paid even the slightest attention to the Attorney General's
poorly reasoned letter, perhaps Congress would have realized that
such an exclusion was unjustified. Moreover, Congress failed to pro-
vide any guidance as to the parameters of the new statutory exclusion,
i.e., what was meant by the terms "personal injury" and "any dam-
ages." Nevertheless, Congress had resolved that the personal injury
exclusion should become part of the Code. And, until recently, it left
to others the task of defining the scope of the exclusion.
Because Congress enacted the personal injury exclusion as a codifi-
cation of then existing law, the most sensible place to begin assessing
the scope of the new provision is the Attorney General's opinion and
Treasury Decision 2747.77 An examination of these documents would
have indicated that the newly-enacted exclusion was limited to physi-
cal injuries. The Attorney General had argued for an exclusion of acci-
dent insurance proceeds, 78 while Treasury Decision 2747 specifically
tied the exclusion to personal injury sustained through an accident.79
The word "accident" connotes physical injury.SO This was certainly
the case in 1918, when actions for emotional distress could not be sus-
74. Id.
75. H.R. RP. No. 65-767 (1918), reprinted in 1939-1 (Pt. 2) C.B. 86, 92.
76. Id.
77. 31 Op. Atty Gen. 304 (1918); T.D. 2747, 20 Treas. Dec. Int. Rev. 457 (1918).
78. 31 Op. Att'y Gen. 304, 307 (1918).
79. T.D. 2747, 20 Treas. Dec. Int. Rev. 457 (1918).
80. This view would later be supported by Justice Stevens's opinion in Commissioner
v. Schleier, 515 U.S. 323 (1995). Writing for the majority, Justice Stevens pro-
vides an illustration of the "usual meaning" of the phrase "on account of personal
injuries." To illustrate the common notion of personal injuries sustained through
an accident, Justice Stevens creates a hypothetical involving an automobile acci-
dent. He then contrasts this concept with an age discrimination suit in which the
discrimination causes both personal injury and lost wages. The recovery of lost
wages, however, is entirely independent of any physical injury suffered. Id. at
2163-64.
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tained without an accompanying physical injury.8 Unfortunately,
Congress did not incorporate the words "sustained through accident"
in the language of the exclusion. The reference is also absent from the
House Report.8 2 But, given Congress' expressed intent to incorporate
Treasury's approach, it seems clear that any attempt to limit the new
exclusion to physical injuries would have been proper.
Treasury initially adopted this view in Senate Bill 1384 when it
considered whether a sum received for damages on account of aliena-
tion of a spouse's affections was excludable from income.8 3 Although
Treasury recognized that the language of the new exclusion seemed to
include "any personal injury" and that it was well settled that the
alienation of a spouse's affections was a personal injury, it held such
damages to be outside the exclusion. "[Ilt appears more probable from
the language of [the exclusion], taken as a whole, referring as it does,
to accident and health insurance and workmen's compensation acts,
that the term 'personal injuries', as used therein means physical inju-
ries only."8 4 Treasury asserted that "[t]his view of the intent of the
statute is supported by the history of the legislation."85
Senate Bill 1384 is also significant because of Treasury's focus on
the issue of "human capital." Relying on the Attorney General's letter
and Treasury Decision 2747, Treasury rejected the extension of the
"human capital" approach to every personal injury. For the exclusion
to apply, Senate Bill 1384 noted that the exclusion required the de-
struction or diminution in the value of a capital asset.8 6 But, it con-
cluded that under no circumstances could a "wife's affections" be
regarded as capital.8 7 Issued shortly after the 1918 Act, Senate Bill
1384 reveals a clear belief on the part of the Treasury Department
that the new statutory exclusion was only applicable when a physical
injury was involved. Moreover, it reflects Treasury's belief that the
human capital theory did not extend to nonphysical injuries. What
then necessitated Congress' 1996 amendment to the personal injury
exclusion?
81. Although one of the first cases recognizing an action solely for emotional distress
was Kine v. Kine, 64 N.E. 9 (Ind. 1902), it was not until 1948 that the American
Law Institute expressly recognized a claim for intentionally inflicted emotional
distress unaccompanied by physical harm. RESTATEMENT (SEcOND) OF TORTS § 46
cmt. k (1965).
82. H.R. REP. No. 65-767 (1918), reprinted in 1939-1 (Pt. 2), C.B. 86, 92.
83. S. 1384, 2 C.B. 71 (1920).
84. Id. Scalia echoed this sentiment in United States v. Burke, 504 U.S. 229, 244
(1992)(Scalia, J., concurring), when he suggested employing a "common-sense in-
terpretation" of the phrase "on account of personal injuries or sickness."
85. S. 1384, 2 C.B. 71 (1920).
86. Id. at 72.
87. Id.
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B. The Nonphysical Personal Injury Exclusion
Given Treasury's contemporaneous declaration in Senate Bill 1384
that the statutory exclusion was inapplicable to nonphysical inju-
ries,88 it is surprising that Treasury soon thereafter created a nonstat-
utory, nonphysical injury exclusion. In Solicitor's Opinion 132,
Treasury readdressed the question of the taxability of damages for
alienation of affections.8 9 It also analyzed the tax treatment of
amounts received for defamation and for the surrender of child cus-
tody rights.90
Referring to its earlier opinion, Treasury reiterated its belief that
the statutory exemption did not include damages for alienation of af-
fection.91 Nevertheless, Treasury found such receipts excludable from
income, not under any statutory authority, but based on the notion
that such receipts were not within the federal tax concept of income as
defined by the Supreme Court the previous year in Eisner v. Ma-
comber.92 According to Treasury, since such personal rights are inca-
pable of being transferred, they cannot be considered income.93 By
declaring such receipts outside the definition of income, Treasury ef-
fectively created an administrative exclusion for nonphysical personal
injuries. Courts and commentators would later forget that this non-
physical injury exclusion was based on Eisner v. Macomber's narrow
definition of income, and not a broad reading of the statutory exclu-
sion.94 As a result, while the Eisner decision was soon reversed, the
Treasury view lived on.
It took only a few years for this administrative exclusion to become
a judicial exclusion. In 1927, the Board of Tax Appeals, 95 in Hawkins
v. Commissioner,96 was asked to rule on the tax treatment of a tax-
88. See id.
89. Sol. Op. 132, 1 C.B. 92 (1922). Treasury opined that the same tax treatment
must be given to these three types of receipts because they are all in the nature of
either personal or family rights, not property rights. Id. at 93.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Id. Eisner v. Macomber, 252 U.S. 189 (1920), presented the question whether
Congress, using powers vested to it by the Sixteenth Amendment, could tax,
without apportionment, a stock dividend as income. In reaching its holding that
such dividends were not taxable, the Court considered the essential characteris-
tic of the stock dividend in relation to the nature of the relationship between a
corporation and stockholder. Id. at 207.
93. Sol. Op. 132, 1 C.B. 92, 93 (1922). In addition to Eisner v. Macomber, Treasury
relied on another Supreme Court ruling, Stratton's Independence v. Hawbert, 231
U.S. 399 (1913), and concluded "it must be held that there is no gain, and there-
fore no income, derived from the receipt of damages for alienation of affections or
defamation of personal character." Sol. Op. 132, 1 C.B. 92, 93 (1922).
94. See infra notes 105-38 and accompanying text.
95. The Board of Tax Appeals was the predecessor to the modem day Tax Court.
96. Hawkins v. Commissioner, 6 B.T. 1023 (1927).
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payer's settlement in a defamation suit against his former employer.97
Also relying on the Supreme Court's holding in Eisner v. Macomber,98
the Board concluded that the settlement was excludable.99 Although
it recognized that Eisner's definition was probably not intended to be
as limiting as its language implied,o0 0 the Board nevertheless found
that the defamation settlement fell outside the Court's definition of
income. 1 0 ' The Board indicated, however, that it did not consider
such awards a return of capital.
Even to the economist, character or reputation or other strictly personal at-
tributes are not capital or otherwise measurable in terms of wealth, notwith-
standing that all will recognize them as important factors of economic success.
They are not property or goods. Such compensation as general damages adds
nothing to the individual, for the very concept which sanctions it prohibits
that it shall include a profit. It is an attempt to make the plaintiff whole as
before the injury. 0 2
While correct in its approach to "capital," the Board also compared
defamation damages with the exclusion for life insurance proceeds,
stating that "[i]f compensation for the loss of life is not taxable as in-
come unless expressly provided, compensation for the injury to per-
sonal reputation should similarly require an express provision."1os
The Board's analysis of the treatment of life insurance proceeds was
incorrect. They were exempt because of a specific statutory exclusion
and not due to Congress' failure to expressly include them in the
97. Id.
98. Id. Not relying solely on Eisner v. Macomber, the Board also cited the Supreme
Court's rulings in the following cases: Bowers v. Kerbaugh-Empire Co., 271 U.S.
170 (1925); Edwards v. Cuba R. Co., 268 U.S. 628 (1925); and Miles v. Safe De-
posit & Trust Co., 259 U.S. 247 (1922). Hawkins v. Commissioner, 6 B.T.A. 1023,
1025 (1927).
99. Hawkins v. Commissioner, 6 B.TNA. 1023, 1024 (1927).
100. Id. In addressing this question of whether Eisners definition of income should be
literally construed, the Board made the following comment:
Whether this description of income is to be regarded as exclusive of
everything not clearly within its terms, so that both the Sixteenth
Amendment and the statute (which is said to be the fullest exercise of
the constitutional power, Eisner v. Macomber, 252 U.S. 189; Irwin v.
Gavit, 268 U.S. 161) are forever to be limited by a judicial definition,
may still be doubtful, for the Supreme Court is not in the habit of defin-
ing words abstractly, but only for the purpose of determining whether
the matter then under consideration comes within their fair intendment.
The court has itself said that word is not a crystal, Towne v. Eisner, 245
U.S. 418, and it is conceivable that since the income tax is primarily an
application of the idea of measuring taxes by financial ability to pay, as
indicated by the net accretions to one's economic wealth during the year,
there may be cases in which taxable income will be judicially found
although outside the precise scope of the description already given.
Id.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. Id.
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Code's definition of income.10 4 The Board should have found the
award taxable because no such statutory exemption existed with re-
spect to defamation awards.
The decision in Hawkins rested solely on Eisner's narrow definition
of income. Both Hawkins and Solicitor's Opinion 132 became the
foundation for the exclusion of nonphysical personal injuries. Unfor-
tunately, this exclusion survived much longer than Eisner v. Ma-
comber's definition of income.
C. Silent Merger
In 1955, the Supreme Court rendered its landmark decision in
Commissioner v. Glenshaw Glass Co.,105 providing a far more expan-
sive definition of income than articulated in Eisner v. Macomber.1O6
The case did not involve personal injuries; rather, the issue was the
tax treatment of punitive damages awarded in a commercial con-
text.'0 7 Taxpayers characterized the awards as windfalls and as-
serted that an exclusion was required by the Court's definition of
income in Eisner v. Macomber.108 Rejecting this argument, the Court
held such awards taxable as an "accession to wealth, clearly realized,
and over which the taxpayers have complete dominion."109
104. The Service would commit a similar error in I.T. 2420, VII-2 C.B. 123 (1928), in
which it found that interest paid on a spouse's death benefits was taxable. The
beneficiary's spouse was a passenger on the ill-fated ship, Lusitania. The death
benefit itself, however, was expressly excluded as income under the Revenue Act
of 1926. CitingHawkins, Treasury concluded that "inasmuch as the award... is
not expressly taxable under the [Code], and is not embraced in the general con-
cept of the term, 'income,' the amount of the award is not taxable." I.T. 2420,
VII-2 C.B. 123, 124 (1928). This pronouncement was later relied upon in Rev.
Rul. 54-19, 1954-1 C.B. 179, wherein the Service excluded from a decedent's gross
estate amounts recovered under the New Jersey "Death by Wrongful Act" stat-
ute. Rev. Rul. 54-19, 1954-1 C.B. 179, 180.
105. Commissioner v. Glenshaw Glass Co., 348 U.S. 426 (1955). The case consolidated
two cases, Commissioner v. Glenshaw Glass Co. and Commissioner v. Goldman
Theatres, Inc. Glenshaw Glass, a manufacturer of glass bottles and containers,
sued and settled with Hartford-Empire Company in an earlier case for exemplary
damages, fraud, and treble damages to recover for injury caused by violation of
the federal antitrust laws. Glenshaw Glass Co. v. Commissioner, 18 T.C. 860,
870-872 (1947). Similarly, Goldman Theatres, an operator of motion picture
houses in Pennsylvania, sued Loew's Inc., alleging federal antitrust violation and
seeking treble damages. William Goldman Theatres, Inc. v. Loew's, Inc., 69 F.
Supp. 103 (E.D. Pa. 1946), affd, 164 F.2d 1021 (3d Cir. 1948), cert. denied, 334
U.S. 811 (1948). Plaintiff won the lawsuit and was awarded treble damages.
106. Eisner v. Macomber, 252 U.S. 189, 207 (1920). This case defined income as "gain
derived from capital, from labor, or from both combined." Id.
107. Commissioner v. Glenshaw Glass Co., 348 U.S. 426, 427-28 (1955).
108. Id. at 431. The taxpayers also cited Highland Farms Corp., which held that puni-
tive damages were excludable. Highland Farms Corp. v. Commissioner, 42
B.TA 1314 (1940).
109. Commissioner v. Glenshaw Glass Co., 348 U.S. 426, 431 (1955).
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In a much debated footnote, the Court distinguished commercial
recoveries from personal injury recoveries.' 10 Noting "[tihe long his-
tory of departmental rulings holding personal injury recoveries non-
taxable on the theory that they roughly correspond to a return of
capital," the Court stated that this return of capital theory could not
support an exclusion for punitive damages awarded for injury to prop-
erty.1ll It did not express an opinion with respect to punitive dam-
ages awarded for personal injury.
The Court's decision in Glenshaw Glass had important implica-
tions for personal injury exclusion analysis, both physical and non-
physical. The Court sanctioned the human capital rationale for
excluding personal injury recoveries. In addition, both the courts and
the Service would later rely on the decision when holding that the per-
sonal injury exclusion does not extend to punitive damages awarded
for personal injuries.112 Glenshaw Glass did not, however, end the
nonphysical injury exclusion. Since the nonstatutory exclusion was
based on Eisner's narrow concept of income,113 Glenshaw Glass
presented an opportunity to dismiss the nonstatutory exclusion as a
relic of the narrower, now obsolete, income definition. Unfortunately,
neither the Service nor the courts remembered the nexus between the
now defunct definition and the nonphysical personal injury exclusion.
In a series of pronouncements issued shortly after the Court's deci-
sion in Glenshaw Glass, the Service renewed its position that non-
physical personal injury receipts were excludable.11 4 Remarkably, it
achieved this without citing any authority and without mentioning
Glenshaw Glass. In Revenue Ruling 55-132, the Service held that
amounts received by former World War II prisoners of war for viola-
tion of the Geneva Convention were "in the nature of reimbursement
for loss of personal rights and are not includable in gross income."115
Revenue Ruling 56-462 provided similar treatment for amounts re-
110. Id. at 432 n.8.
111. Id. (citing 2 C.B. 71; 1-1 C.B. 92, 93; VII-2 C.B. 123; 1954-1 C.B. 179, 180).
112. See Roemer v. Commissioner, 716 F.2d 693 (9th Cir. 1983)(stating that normally,
punitive damage awards are includable in gross income as ordinary income); Rev.
Rul. 84-108, 1984-2 C.B. 32, 34 (referring to Glenshaw Glass to determine that
amounts received exclusively as punitive damages by surviving spouse and child,
in release from liability under wrongful death act, are includable in income);
Debra Cohen-Whelan, supra note 4, at 921 (stating that the Supreme Court ad-
dressed in dicta the taxation of all punitive damages in the "infamous" footnote
8); Wendy S. Kennedy, supra note 4, at 123-25 (referring to Glenshaw Glass as
the first case to address the taxation of punitive damages, providing the basis for
many later court decisions regarding taxation of punitive damages).
113. See supra notes 92-94 and accompanying text.
114. Rev. Rul. 55-132, 1955-1 C.B. 213; Rev. Rul. 56-462, 1956-2 C.B. 20; Rev. Rul. 56-
518, 1956-2 C.B. 25, clarified in Rev. Rul. 57-505, 1957-44 I.R.B. 9; Rev. Rul. 58-
418, 1958-2 C.B. 18.
115. Rev. Rul. 55-132, 1955-1 C.B. 213.
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ceived by former Korean prisoners of war.1 16 In two other rulings,
Revenue Ruling 56-518117 and Revenue Ruling 58-370,118 former citi-
zens of Germany and Austria, respectively, were allowed to exclude
amounts received for persecution by those countries because they
were "in the nature of reimbursement for the deprivation of civil or
personal rights."119
Although the Service did not use Glenshaw Glass to challenge the
nonstatutory exclusion, it did employ the decision to attack the appli-
cation of the exclusion to punitive damages. In Revenue Ruling 58-
418, the Service modified its earlier pronouncement in Solicitor's
Opinion 132 with respect to defamation awards.120 The Service relied
on Glenshaw Glass in limiting that exclusion to compensatory dam-
ages while continuing to recognize an exclusion for defamation
awards.121
The Service's use of Glenshaw Glass in these pronouncements is
curious. It could have cited the decision to eliminate the nonstatutory
exclusion. Instead, the Service relied on the decision to declare puni-
tive damages taxable. Notably, the Service did not mention
§ 104(a)(2) in any of the rulings. That marriage occurred seventeen
years later in the Tax Court's decision in Seay v. Commissioner.122
In Seay, Taxpayer's corporation board removed him from his posi-
tion as president in a manner that resulted in embarrassing publicity
for Taxpayer.' 23 Before initiating a lawsuit, Taxpayer obtained a
lump sum settlement from his former employer, a portion of which
was designated "as compensation for such personal embarrassment,
mental and physical strain and injury to health and personal reputa-
tion in the community."'124 Taxpayer excluded this amount from his
116. Rev. Rul. 56-462, 1956-2 C.B. 20.
117. Rev. Rul. 56-518, 1956-2 C.B. 25.
118. Rev. Rul. 58-370, 1958-2 C.B. 14.
119. Id.
120. Rev. Rul. 58-418, 1958-2 C.B. 18. While recognizing Hawkins' role in excluding
libel awards from income, the ruling states that "[nlo suggestion was made in
such case that punitive or exemplary damages were claimed or paid." Id. at 19.
121. Id.
122. 58 T.C. 32 (1972).
123. Id. at 33. Taxpayer, who was a president of a corporation, wanted to acquire two
divisions of that corporation. After acquiring financial backing of Farmers Union
Grain Terminal Association (GTA), GTA purchased the two divisions under a
new corporation and made Taxpayer its president. When a dispute arose be-
tween the management of GTA and Taxpayer, he was dismissed. However, Tax-
payer, on advice from his lawyer, refused to leave the corporate premises because
of a dispute concerning unsettled management fees. The corporation filed a com-
plaint of trespass against Taxpayer and sought a permanent restraining order to
not occupy the building. This complaint received publicity in local and national
newspapers, causing Taxpayer personal embarrassment and damage to his per-
sonal reputation. Id. at 33-34.
124. Id. at 35.
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return, arguing that the payment was made "on account of personal
injuries" under § 104(a)(2). 12 5 This marked the first time any court
was asked to address the application of the statutory exclusion to non-
physical injuries.
The Commissioner asserted that Taxpayer had not suffered any
kind of personal injury to which § 104(a)(2) might apply, and even if
Taxpayer had suffered an injury within the purview of § 104(a)(2),
Taxpayer failed to link any portion of the settlement to those inju-
ries. 12 6 The Court first considered whether Taxpayer had to present a
valid claim or merely that the nature of the matter settled involved
personal injury.1 2 7 Deciding that the nature of the claim should be the
focus of the inquiry, the Court turned its attention to Taxpayer's
claim.1 2 8
The Commissioner argued that part of the claim was for personal
embarrassment and that "damages for embarrassment [were] not ex-
cludable under section 104(a)(2)."L2 9 The Tax Court, in a confused
opinion, viewed the Commissioner's argument as an admission that
§ 104(a)(2) extended to the taxpayer's nonphysical injuries, although
perhaps not personal embarrassment.
Thus, the respondent does not contend that any of the personal injuries in the
present case, other than embarrassment, are not included within the scope of
section 104(a)(2). Under these circumstances, we believe that the "personal
embarrassment" was incidental to or in aggravation of section 104(a)(2) per-
sonal injuries and that the entire $45,000 payment is, therefore, excludable
under section 104(a)(2). In reaching this conclusion, we have found it unnec-
essary to decide whether damages received in settlement of a claim based
solely upon personal embarrassment would be excludable under section
104(a)(2). 1 30
The Tax Court clearly overreached by stating that the Commissioner
conceded to § 104(a)(2)'s applicability to nonphysical injuries. The re-
sult, however, was a decision that effectively merged the statutory
physical injury exclusion and the nonstatutory nonphysical injury
exclusion.
125. Id. at 36.
126. Id.
127. Id. at 37.
128. Id. The court also cited language from the regulations under § 104(a)(2), provid-
ing that "[tihe term 'damages received (whether by suit or agreement)' means an
amount received through prosecution of a legal suit or action based upon tort or
tort type rights, or through a settlement agreement entered into in lieu of such
prosecution." Id. at 40 (citing Treas. Reg. § 1.104-1(c)). The Tax Court did not
identify the relevance of the regulations, but courts would soon incorporate this
language into their decisions. Eventually, in United States v. Burke, the
Supreme Court would decide that the regulation defined the scope of the exclu-
sion. United States v. Burke, 504 U.S. 229 (1992).
129. Seay v. Commissioner, 58 T.C. 32, 40 (1972).
130. Id.
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The Ninth Circuit perfected this merger in Roemer v. Commis-
sioner.131 The taxpayer in Roemer was an insurance agent who sued a
credit company for issuing a defamatory report, which resulted in his
being denied several agency licenses.132 A California jury awarded
the taxpayer compensatory and punitive damages that he then sought
to exclude under § 104(a)(2).133 The Tax Court found the entire award
taxable, drawing a distinction between damages to personal reputa-
tion and damages to business reputation.13 4
The Ninth Circuit reversed the Tax Court, finding its distinction
between personal and business reputation improper.13 5 The Ninth
Circuit clearly believed that nonphysical injuries were within the am-
bit of § 104(a)(2).
We reverse because we have concluded that the tax court's analysis of this
matter confuses a personal injury with its consequences and illogically distin-
guishes physical from nonphysical personal injuries.
The relevant distinction that should be made is between personal and non-
personal injuries, not between physical and nonphysical injuries. I.R.C.
§ 104(a)(2) states that damages received on account of personal injuries are
excludable; it says nothing about physical injuries. "[Tihe words of statutes-
including revenue acts-should be interpreted where possible in their ordi-
nary, everyday senses." The ordinary meaning of a personal injury is not lim-
ited to a physical one. Indeed, the Service has long said that certain
nonphysical injuries are personal injuries and that all damages received for
nonphysical personal injuries are excludable from gross income. Sol.Op. 132,
I- C.B. 92 (1922)(damages for alienation of affections, defamation of personal
character, and surrender of child custody rights are damages for invasion of
personal rights and not income).1 3 6
The Ninth Circuit took great liberties when interpreting Solicitor's
Opinion 132, a pronouncement that served as the genesis of the non-
statutory exclusion for nonphysical injury awards. The circuit court,
however, cited it as authority for a statutory exclusion of nonphysical
injury recoveries under § 104(a)(2).13 7
131. 716 F.2d 693 (9th Cir. 1983).
132. Id. at 694-95.
133. Id. at 695.
134. Roemer v. Commissioner, 79 T.C. 398, 405 (1982), rev'd, 716 F.2d 693 (9th Cir.
1983). The Treasury Department had first drawn this distinction in Sol. Op. 132.
Sol. Op. 132, 1-1 C.B. 92 (1922). While not citing Sol. Op. 132, the Tax Court was
in effect retaining the limitation of the nonstatutory nonphysical injury exclusion
with respect to defamation claims. Then, finding the taxpayer had failed to carry
his burden of attributing some amount of the award to loss of personal reputa-
tion, the Tax Court found the entire award, both compensatory and punitive,
taxable.
135. Roemer v. Commissioner, 716 F.2d 693 (9th Cir. 1983).
136. Id. at 696-97 (citation omitted). Justice Scalia would later argue the exact oppo-
site statutory construction in United States v. Burke, 504 U.S. 229 (1992). See
infra notes 163-78 and accompanying text.
137. Roemer v. Commissioner, 716 F.2d 693, 697 (9th Cir. 1983). With respect to the
punitive portion of the award, the Ninth Circuit observed that although it would
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Other courts readily adopted the Ninth Circuit's liberal construc-
tion of § 104(a)(2).13s All that remained to complete the circle was for
Congress to codify the error.
D Congress' 1989 Amendment: An Unusual Imprimatur
Throughout this period of judicial and administrative expansion,
Congress remained silent. Then, in 1989, the House of Representa-
tives proposed an amendment to § 104(a)(2), repudiating the courts'
expansive reading.13 9 The proposed amendment read: "[G]ross in-
come does not include... the amount of any damages received.., on
account of personal injuries or sickness in a case involving physical
injury or physical sickness. .... "140 The accompanying committee re-
port confirmed the House's recognition that courts were interpreting
§ 104(a)(2) too broadly. The Report stated that "some courts have held
that the exclusion applies to damages in cases involving employment
discrimination and injury to reputation where there is no physical in-
jury or sickness," but that the committee believed this "inappropriate
where no physical injury or sickness is involved."141
The conference committee rejected the proposed amendment, how-
ever, in favor of a substitute amendment which in effect gave congres-
sional approval to the extension of § 104(a)(2) to nonphysical injuries:
normally be taxable under Glenshaw, it would abide by the Service's ruling in
Rev. Rul. 75-45 and allow an exclusion for the punitive amount as well. Follow-
ing Roemer, the Service issued Rev. Rul. 85-143, which announced that it would
not follow the Ninth Circuit's decision in Roemer, but would instead continue to
follow the Tax Courfts decision. The Service's obstinacy would be short-lived,
however, because shortly thereafter the Tax Court adopted the Ninth Circuitfs
reasoning in Threlkeld v. Commissioner, 87 T.C. 1294 (1986):
Neither section 104(a)(2) nor its legislative history provides much gui-
dance in this regard. A personal injury has long been understood to in-
clude nonphysical as well as physical injuries. Therefore, "personal"
must be defined more broadly than "bodily" injury. The exclusion under
section 104(a)(2) deals with damages received as a result of litigation or
by an agreement in lieu of litigation. The regulations under section
104(a)(2) narrow the scope of damages received to those amounts re-
ceived through prosecution of tort or tort-type rights. Therefore, "tihe
essential element of an exclusion under section 104(a)(2) is that the in-
come involved must derive from some sort of tort claim against the
payor." As a result, common law tort law concepts are helpful in decid-
ing whether a taxpayer is being compensated for "personal injury."
Threlkeld v. Commissioner, 87 T.C. 1294, 1305 (1986), affd, 848 F.2d 81 (6th Cir.
1988)(citations omitted).
138. See, e.g., Thompson v. Commissioner, 866 F.2d 709, 712 (4th Cir. 1989); Threl-
keld v. Commissioner, 848 F.2d 81, 84 (6th Cir. 1988); Bent v. Commissioner, 835
F.2d 67, 70 (3rd Cir. 1987).
139. H.R. REP. No. 101-247, at 1354-55 (1989), reprinted in 1989 U.S.CAN. 1906,
2824-25.
140. H.R. 3299, 101st Cong., 1st. Sess., pt. 2, § 11641 (1989).
141. H.R. REP. No. 101-247, at 1355 (1989), reprinted in 1989 U.S.C.C-.AN. 1906,
2825.
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"Paragraph [§ 104(a)(2)] shall not apply to any punitive damages in
connection with a case not involving physical injury or physical sick-
ness."142 The proposal was signed into law as part of the Omnibus
Budget Reconciliation Act of 1989 and became effective for amounts
received after July 10, 1989.143
Effectively, the 1989 amendment achieved expansion by contrac-
tion. By declaring only punitive damages for nonphysical injuries tax-
able, Congress impliedly extended § 104(a)(2) to compensatory awards
for nonphysical injuries. This was precisely the opposite of the intent
of the House provision and left courts free to apply § 104(a)(2) to non-
physical injuries. Indeed, the 1989 amendment precluded courts from
reversing the judicial merger of the statutory physical injury exclusion
with the nonstatutory physical injury exclusion. Congress would need
to revisit the issue to return § 104(a)(2) to its original scope. The ap-
plication of the exclusion to employment discrimination awards would
provide Congress with the opportunity.
E. Employment Discrimination: The Return to Physical
Judicial extension of § 104(a)(2) to employment discrimination re-
coveries highlighted the theoretical inconsistencies of the personal in-
jury exclusion and propelled Congress to revisit the exclusion. Often,
a substantial portion of an employment discrimination recovery con-
sists of back pay.144 This fact led many courts to question whether the
exclusion of such awards from income could be justified.
142. Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1989, Pub. L. No. 101-239, § 7641(a), 103
Stat. 2106, 2379 (amending I.R.C. § 104(a)(2)(1988)).
143. Id. § 7641(b)(1), 103 Stat. at 2379.
144. See, e.g., Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)(1)
(1988)(prior to 1991 amendment). Title VII authorized back pay as a remedy for
discrimination "with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges
of employment [based on] ... race, color, religion, sex, or national origin." Id.
§ 2000e-2(a)(1). As originally enacted, Title VII did not provide for compensatory
or punitive damage. It did, however, allow a court to "order such affirmative ac-
tion as may appropriate, which may include, but is not limited to, reinstatement
or hiring of employees, with or without back pay.., or any other equitable relief
as the court deems appropriate." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)(1). The Civil Rights Act
of 1991 amended the statute to permit both compensatory and punitive
recoveries.
The second major employment antidiscrimination law, the Age Discrimination
in Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA), provides that
[a]mounts owing to a person as a result of a violation of this chapter
shall be deemed to be unpaid minimum wages or unpaid overtime com-
pensation for purposes of sections 216 and 217 of [the Fair Labor Stan-
dards Act of 1938, as amended (29 U.S.C. §§ 216-17)1: Provided, That
liquidated damages shall be payable only in cases of willful violations of
this chapter. In any action brought to enforce this chapter the court
shall have jurisdiction to grant such legal or equitable relief as may be
appropriate to effectuate the purposes of this chapter, including without
limitation judgments compelling employment, reinstatement or promo-
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Prior to 1989, courts struggled in determining the applicability of
§ 104(a)(2) to employment discrimination recoveries. 145 Although
courts consistently maintained that the inquiry focused on whether
employment discrimination constituted a personal injury,14 6 the re-
sults seemed to depend more on the nature of the remedy. For exam-
ple, several cases bifurcated the recovery into a taxable back pay
award and a nontaxable personal injury award, even though the total
award was based on the same discriminatory acts.14 7
tion, or enforcing the liability for amounts deemed to be unpaid mini-
mum wages or unpaid overtime compensation under this section.
29 U.S.C. § 626(b) (1994). See generally CHARLEs A. SuTuv~AN ET AL., Er"LOY-
imENT DISCRnMNATION §§ 20.8, 20.10 (1988).
145. Burke v. United States, No. CIV.-1-88-508, 1990 WL 56155 (E.D. Tenn.
1990)(holding that damage awards received for sex discrimination under Title
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 were taxable because the payments were con-
sidered back pay), rev'd, 929 F.2d 1119 (6th Cir. 1991), rev'd, 504 U.S. 229 (1992);
Rickel v. Commissioner, 92 T.C. 510 (1989)(concluding that half of the damages
received by the taxpayer for age discrimination under ADEA, Fair Labor Stan-
dard Act (FLSA), and Equal Pay Act were taxable because received as back pay,
while the other half was excludable because received as liquidated damages for
personal injury), rev'd, 900 F.2d 655 (3d Cir. 1990); Pistillo v. Commissioner, 57
T.C.M. (CCH) 874 (1989)(holding that amount received for age discrimination
under ADEA was recompense for lost wages and therefore taxable), rev'd, 912
F.2d 145 (6th Cir. 1990); Byrne v. Commissioner, 90 T.C. 1000 (1988)(holding
that the amount received as settlement for violation of FLSA should be treated
half as contract recovery, thus taxable, and half as compensation for personal
injuries, thus excludable), rev'd, 883 F.2d 211 (3d Cir. 1989); Thompson v. Com-
missioner, 89 T.C. 632 (1987)(holding that the amount received by a taxpayer on
a claim for back pay under sex discrimination in violation of Equal Pay Act was
not received on account of personal injury but for breach of contract, thus taxable,
while the liquidated damages were received for personal injury, thus excludable),
afftd, 866 F.2d 709 (4th Cir. 1989); Metzer v. Commissioner, 88 T.C. 834
(1987)(holding that half of the damage award for discrimination based on sex and
national origin was taxable because it represented back pay for undercompensa-
tion, while the other half of the damage award was excludable because it compen-
sated personal injury), affd without opinion, 845 F.2d 1013 (3d Cir. 1988); Hodge
v. Commissioner, 64 T.C. 616 (1975)(holding that the full amount of the damages
received for discrimination in violation of Title VII was includable in gross in-
come because the settlement consisted only of back pay). But see Bent v. Com-
missioner, 87 T.C. 225 (1986)(holding that damage settlement for violation of
taxpayer's right to freedom of speech was received "on account of personal in-
jury," thus not taxable, even though the settlement was calculated based on
wages lost), affd, 835 F.2d 67 (3d Cir. 1987).
146. See, e.g., Thompson v. Commissioner, 866 F.2d 709, 711 (4th Cir. 1989); Bent v.
Commissioner, 835 F.2d 67, 69 (3d Cir. 1987); Roemer v. Commissioner, 716 F.2d
693, 697 (9th Cir. 1983).
147. See, e.g., Rickel v. Commissioner, 92 T.C. 510, 522 (1989), rev'd, 900 F.2d 655 (3d
Cir. 1990); Metzer v. Commissioner, 88 T.C. 834, 858 (1987), affld without opin-
ion, 845 F.2d 1013 (3d Cir. 1988); Thompson v. Commissioner, 89 T.C. 632 (1987),
affd, 866 F.2d 709 (4th Cir. 1989).
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Following the 1989 amendment, however, most courts returned to
the approach first enunciated by the Ninth Circuit in Roemer.'4s If
the employment discrimination claim was found to be personal in na-
ture, then all damages (other than punitive damages specifically made
taxable by the 1989 amendment) were excludable.149
The Third Circuit's decision in Rickel v. Commissioner illustrates
this analysis.150 In Rickel, Taxpayer brought a claim under the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act's' (ADEA) after his employer first
denied him a promotion and then subsequently terminated him from
his job, in both instances, in favor of a younger employee.152 Taxpayer
and the employer reached a settlement, which Taxpayer claimed was
excludable under § 104(a)(2)..53
The Tax Court's analysis focused on the available statutory reme-
dies.154 It decided that the back pay award, as "amounts received in
lieu of wages,"'155 was income, while the liquidated damages, although
measured by lost income, were intended "to compensate for those diffi-
cult to measure personal injuries that are the consequence of age
discrimination."156
The Third Circuit rejected the Tax Court's remedy analysis, hold-
ing the entire award to be excludable. In so deciding, the circuit court
reiterated its view that the nature of the claim, and not the available
remedies, should govern.157 As support for its expansive reading of
§ 104(a)(2), the Third Circuit noted the effect of the 1989 amendment:
[The conference amendment] is significant to our analysis because the original
bill introduced in the House of Representatives would have limited the
§ 104(a)(2) exclusion to cases involving physical injury or physical sickness.
As the House Ways and Means Committee explained the bill, "some courts
have held that the exclusion applies to damages in cases involving employ-
ment discrimination," but that the "committee believes that such treatment is
inappropriate where no physical injury or sickness is involved." H.R. Rep. No.
247, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 1354-55, reprinted in, 1990 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad-
min. News 2824-25. The Senate bill contained no such amendment to
§ 104(a)(2). In its final conference bill, Congress chose to implicitly endorse
the courts' expansive interpretation of § 104(a)(2) to encompass nonphysical
injuries and merely circumscribe the scope of the exemption as to only one
148. Roemer v. Commissioner, 716 F.2d 693 (9th Cir. 1983).
149. See, e.g., Pistillo v. Commissioner, 912 F.2d 145, 150 (6th Cir. 1990); Downey v.
Commissioner, 97 T.C. 150, 173 (1991), rev'd, 33 F.3d 836 (7th Cir. 1994).
150. Rickel v. Commissioner, 900 F.2d 655 (3rd Cir. 1990).
151. 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-643 (1982)(§§ 635-643 repealed 1985).
152. Rickell v. Commissioner, 900 F.2d 655, 656 (3d Cir. 1990).
153. Id. at 657.
154. Rickel v. Commissioner, 92 T.C. 510, 521 (1989), rev'd, 900 F.2d 655 (3d Cir.
1990).
155. Id. at 518.
156. Id. at 522.
157. Rickel v. Commissioner, 900 F.2d 655, 659 (citing Roemer v. Commissioner, 716
F.2d 693 (9th Cir. 1983)).
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type of remedy, i.e., punitive damages, and not other types of remedies typi-
cally available in employment discrimination cases, such as back pay.1 5 8
Thus, the Third Circuit concluded that Congress intended the nature
of an age discrimination injury, and not its attendant consequences
(i.e., liquidated damages, back pay, etc.), to be determinative.159
Since the court found age discrimination to be a personal injury, the
taxpayer could exclude the entire award, including back pay.160
Following the Third Circuit's decision in Rickel, both the Tax Court
and the Sixth Circuit rendered decisions holding that back pay awards
for employment discrimination were excludable under § 104(a)(2).1 61
The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia ques-
tioned the exclusion of employment discrimination awards under
§ 104(a)(2);36 2 as a result, the Supreme Court attempted to resolve the
debate.
United States v. Burke16S involved a taxpayer who had received a
back pay award for sex discrimination under pre-1991 Title VII.164
Because the taxpayer's award was limited to.back pay, the Tax Court
found the award taxable, simply stating that back pay was income
under the Code.165 The Sixth Circuit reversed and applied a "nature
of the claim" approach, holding that sex discrimination resulted in a
personal injury and that back pay was only a measure of the
damages.166
The Supreme Court rejected the Sixth Circuit's analysis insofar as
it focused on the nature of the claim. The court instead opted to focus
on the remedial scheme of the statute under which the claim was
158. Id. at 664 (internal citation omitted).
159. Id. at 663-64.
160. Id. at 666-67.
161. E.g., Pistillo v. Commissioner, 912 F.2d 145 (6th Cir. 1990); Downey v. Commis-
sioner, 97 T.C. 150 (1991), rev'd, 33 F.3d 836 (7th Cir. 1994).
162. Sparrow v. Commissioner, 949 F.2d 434 (D.C. Cir. 1991).
163. 504 U.S. 229 (1992).
164. Id. Title VII was amended by the Civil Rights Act of 1991. Pub. L. No. 102-166,
105 Stat. 1071. Under the amended Act, victims of intentional discrimination
may receive compensatory and punitive damages. Id. The 1991 amendments did
not affect the taxpayer's claim in Burke, thereby allowing the Court to rely upon
the pre-1991 statute. See United States v. Burke, 504 U.S. 229, 238 n.8 (1992).
165. Burke v. United States, No. CIV.-1-88-508, 1990 WL 56155 (E.D. Tenn. 1990),
rev'd, 929 F.2d 1119 (6th Cir. 1991), rev'd, 504 U.S. 229 (1992).
166. Burke v. United States, 929 F.2d 1119, 1123 (6th Cir. 1991), rev'd, 504 U.S. 229
(1992). The Sixth Circuit's conclusion was consistent with its decision a year ear-
lier in Pistillo v. Commissioner, in which it adopted the "nature of the claim test"
and found an ADEA award excludable. Pistillo v. Commissioner, 912 F.2d 145
(6th Cir. 1990)(citing Roemer v. Commissioner, 716 F.2d 693 (9th Cir. 1983)). In
reaching its decision in Burke, the Sixth Circuit concluded that no reason existed
to distinguish between a personal injury resulting from age discrimination and
one resulting from sex discrimination. Burke v. United States, 929 F.2d 1119,
1123 (6th Cir. 1991), rev'd, 504 U.S. 229 (1992).
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brought.167 The Court's remedy analysis differed substantially from
the Tax Court's pre-1989 remedy analysis.16 s The Supreme Court did
not analyze the remedy to determine what portion of an award was
excludable (i.e., back pay versus liquidated damages), but rather to
determine if the claim was one of personal injury.1 69
In examining this question, the Court focused on the effect of
Treasury Regulation 1.104(c), which provided that for a claim to qual-
ify as a personal injury, it must be tort-like.17o The Court then ex-
plained that for an employment discrimination claim to be tort-like,
the statutory remedies had to be comparable to traditional tort reme-
dies.171 The Court noted that Title VII, in its pre-1991 form, did not
provide for punitive damages or jury trials, items traditionally avail-
able in tort-type cases.1 72 In addition, Title VII did not compensate
for "pain and suffering, emotional distress, harm to reputation, or
other consequential damages."1 73 As a result, the Court found that a
Title VII claim was not for personal injury and therefore the award
was taxable.1 74
Justice Scalia, while concurring in the result, advocated a very
different reading of § 104(a)(2). In his view, nonphysical injuries were
"not within the range of reasonable interpretation of statutory
text."1 75 Acknowledging the ambiguity of the term personal injury,
Scalia nonetheless argued that "its more common connotation em-
braces only physical injuries to the person (as when the consequences
of an auto accident are divided into 'personal injuries' and 'property
damages'), or perhaps, in addition, injuries to a person's mental
health."176 Moreover, Scalia suggested that this narrower reading
167. United States v. Burke, 604 U.S. 229, 241 (1992).
168. See supra notes 145-47 and accompanying text.
169. United States v. Burke, 504 U.S. 229, 238-39 (1992).
170. Id. at 234. The full text of Treas. Reg. § 1.104-1(c) reads:
Damages received on account of personal injuries or sickness. Section
104(a)(2) excludes from gross income the amount of any damages re-
ceived (whether by suit or agreement) on account of personal injuries or
sickness. The term "damages received (whether by suit or agreement)"
means an amount received (other than workmen's compensation)
through prosecution of a legal suit or action based upon tort or tort type
rights, or through a settlement agreement entered into in lieu of such
prosecution.
26 C.F.R. § 1.104-1(c) (1991).
171. United States v. Burke, 504 U.S. 229, 235 (1992).
172. Id. at 237-38.
173. Id. at 239.
174. Id. at 242.
175. United States v. Burke, 504 U.S. 229, 242 (1992)(Scalia, J., concurring)(citing
Chevron U.SA, Inc. v. National Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837
(1984)).
176. Id. Justice Scalia observed that this interpretation reflected the Service's origi-
nal understanding of the predecessor to § 104(a)(2). Id. at 243 n.2.
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made sense when compared against the remainder of § 104's lan-
guage: 'personal injuries' appears not in isolation but as part of the
phrase 'personal injuries or sickness.'"177 According to Scalia, sick-
ness also connotes injuries to "physical (or mental) health."178
Justice Scalia ignored Congress' 1989 amendment to § 104(a)(2),
which specifically refers to nonphysical injuries. Although this lan-
guage casts doubt on his argument, he fails to mention it. Neverthe-
less, Justice Scalia's opinion marked the first attempt to return
§ 104(a)(2) to its physical limits. The Court's next venture into
§ 104(a)(2) would only strengthen that effort.
Burke's remedial scheme test soon proved unworkable. Prior to the
decision, the circuits had been unanimous in holding amounts re-
ceived under ADEA as personal injury awards excludable under
§ 104(a)(2). 179 Under the new remedial scheme test, however, a split
soon developed,80 requiring the Court to revisit § 104(a)(2) less than
two years after its decision in Burke.
In Commissioner v. Schleier,18' the taxpayer was an airline pilot
who was terminated upon his reaching age sixty pursuant to company
poicy.3182 The taxpayer brought an ADEA claim against the airline
and subsequently settled, with half of the settlement designated as
back pay and the other half as liquidated damages.183 The Tax
Court,18 4 in a decision affirmed by the Fifth Circuit,1s5 found the
award excludable under Burke's remedial scheme test, satisfied that
the ADEA provided the broad, more tort-like remedial scheme re-
quired by the Court.186
177. Id. at 243.
178. Id. at 243-44. Justice Scalia referred to three other instances in § 104 where the
words "personal injury or sickness" are used, observing that "in each instance its
sense is necessarily limited to injuries to physical and mental health." Id. at 244.
The three instances entailed workmen's compensation, accident and health in-
surance, and "amounts received as a pension, annuity or similar allowance for
personal injuries resulting from active service in the armed forces.., or as a
disability annuity payable ... under the Foreign Service Act." Id.
179. See supra notes 148-68 and accompanying text.
180. See, e.g., Schmitz v. Commissioner, 34 F.3d 790 (9th Cir. 1994)(holding that both
back pay and liquidated damages received in settlement for discrimination under
ADEA were excludable from gross income), vacated, 115 S. Ct. 2573 (1995); Dow-
ney v. Commissioner, 33 F.3d 836 (7th Cir. 1994)(holding that settlement pay-
ments for discrimination under ADEA were not excludable from gross income).
181. 515 U.S. 323 (1995).
182. Id. at 325.
183. Id. at 325-27.
184. Schleier v. Commissioner, No. 22909-90, 1993 WL 767976 (U.S. Tax Ct. Jul. 7,
1993).
185. Schleier v. Commissioner, 26 F.3d 1119 (5th Cir. 1994)(unpublished table deci-
sion), rev'd, 515 U.S. 323 (1995).
186. Id. The Tax Court granted the taxpayer's motion for summary judgment based
on its decision in Downey v. Commissioner, 100 T.C. 40 (1993), rev'd, 33 F.3d 836
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The Supreme Court reversed.18 7 Justice Stevens, writing for the
majority, stated that while Burke had focused on whether a statute
provided tort-like remedies, it did not do away with "the basic require-
ment found in both the statute and the regulation that only amounts
received 'on account of personal injuries or sickness' come within
§ 104(a)(2)'s exclusion."1ss In other words, to be excluded, a recovery
had to satisfy two requirements: (1) the statute under which injury
was claimed had to set forth a tort-like remedial scheme and (2) the
damages had to have been paid for personal injury.s9
The Court did not provide a test for determining when an amount
was received for personal injury, in effect saying, we will know it when
we see it.190 Justice Stevens, however, provided an illustration of
what the Court found excludable by comparing the taxpayer's ADEA
claim to "a typical recovery in a personal injury case."19 1 He posited
an auto accident in which a taxpayer who is injured suffers medical
expenses, lost wages, pain and suffering, and emotional distress. In
such instances, the entire settlement should be excluded.
The medical expenses for injuries arising out of the accident clearly constitute
damages received "on account of personal injuries."... Finally, the recovery
for lost wages is also excludable as being "on account of personal injuries," as
long as the lost wages resulted from time in which the taxpayer was out of
work as a result of her injuries.192
Then, in language that defies logic, Justice Stevens wrote that a
recovery under ADEA is not a personal injury.
Respondent's recovery of back wages, though at first glance comparable to our
hypothetical accident victim's recovery of lost wages, does not fall within
§ 104(a)(2)'s exclusion because it does not satisfy the critical requirement of
being "on account of personal injury or sickness." Whether one treats respon-
dent's attaining the age of 60 or his being laid off on account of his age as the
proximate cause of respondents loss of income, neither the birthday nor the
discharge can fairly be described as a "personal injury" or "sickness." More-
(7th Cir. 1994), holding ADEA awards excluded under Burke's remedial scheme
test.
187. Commissioner v. Schleier, 515 U.S. 323 (1995).
188. Id.
189. Id. (emphasis added).
190. This loosely framed guidepost is reminiscent of the Warren Court's inarticulable
definition of obscenity. In an often quoted concurring opinion, Justice Stewart
described the test for obscenity in the following manner:
It is possible to read the Court's opinion in Roth v. United States and
Alberts v. California ... in a variety of ways.... I shall not today at-
tempt further to define the kinds of material I understand to be em-
braced within that shorthand description; and perhaps I could never
succeed in intelligibly doing so. But I know it when I see it, and the mo-
tion picture involved in this case is not that.
Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964)(Stewart, J., concurring)(citations
omitted)(emphasis added).
191. Commissioner v. Scheier, 515 U.S. 323, 329 (1995).
192. Id. (citation omitted).
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over, though respondent's unlawful termination may have caused some psy-
chological or "personal" injury comparable to the intangible pain and suffering
caused by an automobile accident, it is clear that no part of respondent's re-
covery of back wages is attributable to that injury. Thus, in our automobile
hypothetical, the accident causes a personal injury which in turn causes a loss
of wages. In age discrimination, the discrimination causes both personal in-
jury and loss of wages, but neither is linked to the other. The amount of back
wages recovered is completely independent of the existence or extent of any
personal injury.19 3
It is difficult to comprehend how a claim for age discrimination can
cause both personal injury and lost income without the two being
linked together. Indeed, the only apparent distinction between what
Justice Stevens regards as excludable and what he regards as includ-
able is the presence of a physical injury..
The Supreme Court's decisions in Burke and Schleier clearly exhib-
ited the Court's discomfort in applying § 104(a)(2) in a nonphysical
context. In neither case, however, did the Court articulate a rule lim-
iting § 104(a)(2) to physical injuries. The time had arrived for Con-
gress to provide a definitive statement as to the scope of § 104(a)(2).
III. THE 1996 AMENDMENT: CONGRESS GETS PHYSICAL
On August 20, 1996, President Clinton signed into law the Small
Business Job Protection Act (hereinafter the 1996 Act).194 Among the
expressed purposes of the 1996 Act are tax relief for small businesses
and job protection with increased take-home pay for workers.195 The
1996 Act makes major changes in Subchapter S196 and eases pension
rules for small business owners.197
What does this small business tax legislation have to do with the
personal injury exclusion? The answer is revenue. To pay for the tax
relief afforded small businesses under the new Act, Congress tacked
onto the 1996 Act a series of provisions designed to raise revenue.198
One of these revenue generators amends § 104(a)(2) to provide that
gross income does not include
193. Id. at 330.
194. Small Business Job Protection Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-188, 110 Stat. 1755.
195. Id.
196. Subchapter S of the Code provides partnership-type taxation for electing corpora-
tions. I.R.C. §§ 1361-1379 (West 1997). The new Subchapter S provisions pro-
vide for an increase in the number of allowable shareholders in an S-corporation
from 35 to 75. Small Business Job Protection Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-188,
§ 1301, 110 Stat. 1755, 1777. Another provision allows S corporations to form
affiliated groups. Id. § 1308, 110 Stat. at 1782-83.
197. Small Business Job Protection Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-188, §§ 1301-1309,
110 Stat. 1775, 1777-87. One of the more notable changes is the simplified distri-
bution rules for pensions. Id. §§ 1401-1404, 110 Stat. at 1787-92.
198. Id. §§ 1601-1617, 110 Stat. at 1827-58.
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(2) the amount of any damages (other than punitive damages) received
(whether by suit or agreement and whether as lump sums or as periodic pay-
ments) on account of personal physical injuries or physical sickness.1 9 9
In addition, the 1996 Act eliminates the 1989 amendment language
and replaces it with the following:
For purposes of paragraph (2), emotional distress shall not be treated as a
physical injury or physical sickness. The preceding sentence shall not apply
to an amount of damages not in excess of the amount paid for medical care
(described in subparagraph (A) or (B) of Section 213(d)(1)) attributable to emo-
tional distress. 200
The amendments apply to any amount received after the date of en-
actment unless the amount received is subject to a written binding
agreement, court decree, or mediation award entered into on or before
September 13, 1995.201
The 1996 Act amended § 104(a)(2) to directly address the interpre-
tive difficulties that courts had been unable to resolve: whether
§ 104(a)(2) should extend to nonphysical injuries and whether puni-
tive damages awarded for physical injuries should be excluded. With
the possible exception of a narrowly drawn exclusion for emotional
distress, amended § 104(a)(2)'s language now provides that only recov-
eries for compensatory damages received as a result of physical injury
or physical sickness are excludable.202
The personal injury exclusion appears to have come full circle. Op-
timists will predict an end to the debate surrounding the exclusion;
but just as the 1989 amendment did not end the confusion, neither
does Congress' latest effort. The new provision raises both interpre-
tive and theoretical questions. Congress left undefined both the line
between physical and nonphysical injuries and physical and nonphysi-
cal sickness. In addition, neither the statute nor the legislative his-
tory provides adequate guidance for cases involving a mix of physical
and nonphysical injuries and physical and nonphysical sickness.
Moreover, it is unclear from the wording of the statute whether Con-
gress did indeed create a limited nonphysical injury exclusion for
amounts received on account of emotional distress. The statutory lan-
guage can be read to provide a far different result, namely, as a limit
on the physical injury exclusion when a portion of the award is attrib-
utable to emotional distress.
The problems surrounding the amended provision are not solely
interpretive. The revised statute will renew the debate over the ap-
199. Id. § 1605(a), 110 Stat. at 1838 (emphasis added). This language is almost identi-
cal to that proposed by the House in 1989. See supra notes 140-41 and accompa-
nying text.
200. Small Business Job Protection Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-188, § 1605(b), 110
Stat. 1755, 1838.
201. Id. § 1605(d)(2), 110 Stat. at 1839.
202. Id. § 1605(a), 110 Stat. at 1838.
1997]
NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW
propriateness of any personal injury exclusion. As detailed in Part II
of this Article, the original physical injury exclusion was based on a
human capital construct that ignored tax doctrine. Human capital
theory has been modernized to provide a justification for an exclusion
that is consistent with current tax theory. Congress' return of
§ 104(a)(2) to its physical limits will call into question the adequacy of
human capital theory in supporting the narrower exclusion.
Before turning to these questions, however, another question must
be addressed, namely, how should courts interpret preamendment
§ 104(a)(2) in light of the 1996 Act? With the substantial number of
successful litigants in employment discrimination cases alone in the
past five years, practitioners and employers need guidance in
thousands of awards and settlements. Thousands more have received
buyouts during the recent downsizing effort by major corporations.
Many of these companies have secured releases from former employ-
ees waiving their rights to sue under various state and federal em-
ployment discrimination statutes. Since these recoveries were
received prior to the effective date of the 1996 Act, many will argue
that at least some portion is excludable.203 Moreover, corporations
making such payments have concerns regarding withholding and em-
ployment tax exposure.
A. Pre-1996 Act Awards
The 1996 Act provides no guidance with respect to preenactment
awards. The conference report ascribes all interpretive difficulties
under the prior provision to the judiciary, stating the following:
[clourts have interpreted the exclusion from gross income of damages ...
broadly in some cases to cover awards for personal injury that do not relate to
a physical injury or sickness. For example, some courts have held that the
exclusion applies to damages in cases involving certain forms of employment
discrimination and injury to reputation where there is no physical injury or
sickness. The damages received in these cases generally consist of back pay
203. See, e.g., Sheryl Stratton, "Downsized'IBM Workers Take New Approach To Dam-
age Exclusion, 71 TAx NoTEs 438 (1996). According to Stratton, IBM required the
almost 200,000 workers that it laid off since 1986 to sign nonsuit agreements in
exchange for tenure-based severance packages. Id. at 439. Currently, more than
3,000 of these former IBM employees are challenging the taxability of these pay-
ments. Id. at 438. Relying on a personal injury theory, they contend that a vari-
ety of emotional and physical symptoms, including insomnia and other sleep
disorders, weight gain, headaches, hypertension, and hearing trouble resulted
from the trauma associated with being casualties of the company's downsizing
efforts. Id. at 439. Furthermore, the former employees assert that their pain and
suffering has caused alcoholism, marital problems, and depression. BM, the em-
ployees argue, made the severance payments to avoid exposure to personal injury
claims. Id.
[Vol. 76:51
PERSONAL INJURY EXCLUSION
and other awards intended to compensate the claimant for lost wages or lost
profits.2 04
Notwithstanding these observations, Congress did not identify
these interpretive difficulties as its motivation for amending
§ 104(a)(2). This is quite different from the legislative history that ac-
companied the House's failed attempt in 1989 to limit § 104(a)(2) to
physical injuries.205 There, the House clearly indicated that it found
inappropriate the courts' broad interpretation. Congress took a far
different approach with the 1996 Act, refusing to criticize the courts'
expansive interpretation of § 104(a)(2). 20 6 Indeed, the conference re-
port explicitly declined to address preenactment recoveries involving
nonphysical injuries. "No inference is intended as to the application of
the exclusion to damages prior to the effective date of the House bill in
connection with a case not involving a physical injury or physical
sickness."2o7
Congress adopted the same noncommittal stance with respect to
preenactment punitive damages awarded for physical injuries. 208 The
conference report recognizes that "[c]ourts presently differ as to
whether the exclusion applies to punitive damages received in connec-
tion with a case involving physical injury or physical sickness."209
But here also the conference report provides that no inference is to be
drawn concerning the treatment of awards obtained prior to the 1996
Act.2 10 Congress' refusal to provide any guidance on issues that have
plagued the courts for almost eighty years is frustrating. Congress
seems to be admitting that it does not know the scope of preenactment
§ 104(a)(2). Certainly the legislative history accompanying the exclu-
gion's original enactment in 1918 and its amendment in 1989 would
support this assessment of Congress' understanding.2 11 At each stage
of § 104(a)(2)'s legislative development, Congress has failed to pre-
cisely define the parameters of the exclusion.
204. H.R. CoNrF. REP. No. 104-737, at 300 (1996), reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.CAN. 1677,
1792. The conference report comments that the Supreme Court, in its decision in
Commissioner v. Schleier, 515 U.S. 323 (1995), held that damages received under
ADEA were taxable and that the IRS had suspended guidance in 95-B with re-
spect to the tax treatment of employment discrimination awards.
205. See supra notes 139-41 and accompanying text.
206. H.R. CONF. RFP. No. 104-737, at 301 (1996), reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1677,
1793. See supra note 204 and accompanying text.
207. H.R. CoNF. REP. No. 104-737, at 301 (1996), reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.N. 1677,
1793.
208. Id. at 300-01, reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.CA.N. at 1792-93.
209. Id. at 300, reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 1792. Note, however, that after the
conference report, in O'Gilvie v. United States, 117 S. Ct. 452 (1996), the Supreme
Court held that preenactment punitive damages awarded for physical injuries
were indeed taxable income.
210. H.R. CoNF. REP. No. 104-737, at 301 (1996), reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1677,
1792.
211. See supra notes 73-76 and accompanying text.
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How should courts interpret preenactment § 104(a)(2)? A compari-
son of the old and new versions suggests preeffective date nonphysical
injury awards should be excluded. The amended version specifically
refers to personalphysical injury orphysical sickness. This suggests a
broad reading of its predecessor, from which such language was ab-
sent.212 The problem with this statutory construction, however, is
that Congress expressly stated that no inference can be drawn from
the new statute's language when interpreting the earlier version.213
Perhaps what is necessary is closer attention to the historical develop-
ment of the nonphysical exclusion. As was demonstrated in Part II of
this Article, the exclusion for nonphysical injuries resulted from the
merger by the Tax Court of the pre-Glenshaw Glass nonstatutory ex-
clusion with the statutory exclusion of § 104(a)(2). 214 The nonphysical
exclusion should never'have survived Glenshaw Glass. Courts should
therefore limit the pre-1996 Act version of § 104(a)(2) to physical inju-
ries. This should be done despite any contrary inferences that may be
drawn from the 1989 amendment. Regardless of the language used in
the 1989 amendment, Congress never intended to extend § 104(a)(2)
to nonphysical injuries.
With respect to preeffective date awards of punitive damages on
account of physical injuries, the Supreme Court has already spoken.
In O'Gilvie v. United States, the Court finally resolved the discrepancy
between the federal circuits when it decided that the preenactment
punitive damages awarded for physical injuries were includable in
gross income.215 The Court sided with the government's reasoning
that punitive damages were not "'received ... on account of the per-
sonal injuries, but rather were awarded 'on account of a defendant's
reprehensible conduct and the jury's need to punish and to deter
it."216 Further, the Court cited Commissioner v. Scheleier,217 stating
that the Supreme Court in that case came close to resolving the puni-
tive damages controversy when it stated that "pain and suffering dam-
ages, medical expenses, and lost wages in an ordinary tort case are
covered by [§ 104(a)(2)]" because they are designed to compensate the
victim, whereas punitive damages are not.21 8
212. Small Business Job Protection Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-188, § 1605(a)(2), 110
Stat. 1755, 1838 (emphasis added).
213. See supra note 207 and accompanying text.
214. Seay v. Commissioner, 58 T.C. 32 (1972).
215. O'Gilvie v. United States, 117 S. Ct. 452 (1996).
216. Id. at 455.
217. Commissioner v. Schleier, 515 U.S. 323 (1995).
218. O'Gilvie v. United States, 117 S. Ct. 452, 455 (1996).
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B. Physical/Nonphysical: Drawing the Line
The 1996 Act limits the personal injury exclusion to recoveries for
"physical injuries or physical sickness."2' 9 Unfortunately, the statute
fails to provide a definition of this phrase. The only statutory gui-
dance as to the meaning of the terms "physical injuries" and "physical
sickness" comes from the provision's language regarding emotional
distress.
For purpose of paragraph (2), emotional distress shall not be treated as a
physical injury or physical sickness. The preceding sentence shall not apply
to an amount of damages not in excess of the amount paid for medical care
(described in subparagraph (A) or (B) of section 213(dX1)) attributable to emo-
tional distress. 2 2 0
This language reasonably produces two very different interpreta-
tions. First, the section might mean that a recovery solely for emo-
tional distress unaccompanied by a physical injury is to be treated as
a taxable nonphysical injury award, except to the extent of medical
costs incurred in treating the emotional distress. Under this reading,
§ 104(a)(2) contains a limited nonphysical injury exclusion for claims
of emotional distress. But the language might instead limit the exclu-
sion for physical injury and physical sickness. Under this reading,
when a claim of physical injury or physical sickness includes damages
for emotional distress, the only portion of the emotional distress recov-
ery that may be excluded is the amount received for medical cost
reimbursement.
While the actual language of the statute more clearly supports the
latter reading, the legislative history indicates Congress' intention to
provide a limited nonphysical injury exclusion.221 The conference re-
port states that "[because all damages received on account of physical
injury or physical sickness are excludable from gross income, the ex-
clusion from gross income applies to any damages received based on a
claim of emotional distress that is attributable to a physical injury or
219. Small Business Job Protection Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-188, § 1605, 110 Stat.
1755, 1838.
220. Id. Section 213(d)(1) of the Code provides:
(1) The term "medical care" means amounts paid-
(A) for the diagnosis, cure, mitigation, treatment, or prevention of dis-
ease, or for the purpose of affecting any structure or function of the
body.
(B) for transportation primarily for and essential to medical care re-
ferred to in subparagraph (A), or
(C) for insurance (including amounts paid as premiums under part B
of title XVIH of the Social Security Act, relating to supplementary
medical insurance for the aged) covering medical care referred to in
subparagraphs (A) and (B).
I.R.C. § 213(d)(1) (1986).
221. H.R. CoNF. REP. No. 104-737, at 301 (1996), reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1677,
1793.
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physical sickness."222 Thus, a court consulting the legislative history
will adopt the view that Congress created a limited nonphysical exclu-
sion, whereas a court limiting itself to the statute's plain meaning will
adopt the view that Congress was further narrowing the physical in-
jury exclusion. As a result, it is very likely that Congress will need to
revisit this language in the near future.
Congress' focus on emotional distress recoveries is somewhat puz-
zling. If the broader reading is accurate, then amounts received for
emotional distress are fully excludable only if accompanied by a physi-
cal injury. State tort policy, however, has moved in the opposite direc-
tion.22 3 Fifty years ago, states were reluctant to allow damages for
emotional distress independent of some already recognized (physical)
tort, such as assault, battery, false imprisonment, trespass to land,
nuisance, or invasion of right of privacy.2 24 A variety of reasons were
given, including concerns over proof and valuation, the fear of fraudu-
lent claims, and a flood of litigation.225 Emotional distress was re-
garded as "something metaphysical, too subtle and speculative to be
capable of measurement by any standard known to the law."2 2 6 But
then courts began to grapple with the other side of the coin: fears that
plaintiffs would fabricate claims of physical injury to gain recovery.22 7
Courts also discovered that their earlier concerns with proof and valu-
ation were overstated; such claims more often than not presented the
same difficulties as other components of personal injury.2 28 Today, a
clear majority of states recognize emotional distress as an independ-
ent cause of action.229
Thus, the new language of § 104(a)(2) is inapposite to the direction
of state tort policy. One wonders whether the policy concerns that mo-
tivated modern state tort policy will now be realized by federal tax
tribunals. To achieve the maximum exclusion for emotional distress
recoveries under the 1996 Act, a plaintiff also must claim physical in-
jury or physical sickness. Arguably, therefore, taxpayers will be moti-
vated to allege some type of physical contact or physical symptoms.
Further interpretive difficulties exist with regard to the words
"physical injury or physical sickness." Congress failed to stipulate
whether physical contact is required or whether physical manifesta-
tions of a nonphysical injury would suffice. The conference report
222. Id.
223. Annotation, Modern Status of Intentional Infliction of Mental Distress as In-
dependent Tort; "Outrage," 38 A.L.R.4th 998 (1985).
224. Id. at 1002-03.
225. W. PAGE KEErON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAw OF ToRTs § 12, at 55
(5th ed. 1984).
226. Id. (quotations omitted).
227. Samms v. Eccles, 358 P.2d 344, 345 (Utah 1961).
228. KEETON, supra note 225, at 55.
229. Annotation, supra note 223, at 1003-16.
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states that the emphasis should be on the origin of the claim. "If an
action has its origin in a physical injury or physical sickness, then all
damages (other than punitive damages) that flow therefrom are
treated as payments received on account of physical injury or physical
sickness ....-"230 The conference report is silent, however, with re-
spect to the presence of physical sickness when the origin of the action
is a nonphysical injury, i.e., sexual harassment resulting in an ulcer or
intentional infliction of emotional distress resulting in suicide. Since
the amended statute provides an exclusion for amounts paid for physi-
cal injury "or" physical sickness, presumably some portion of such
awards should be excludable.
In limiting § 104(a)(2) to physical injuries or sickness, Congress no
doubt thought it had drawn a line capable of enforcement. It is un-
likely, however, that taxpayers, the Service, or the courts will easily
agree upon the demarcation between taxable awards for nonphysical
injuries or sickness and excludable amounts for physical injuries or
sickness. Given the tax consequences, most claims will likely include
some allegation of physical injury or physical sickness. Congress
failed to provide any method for determining the tax treatment of
such mixed recoveries. Moreover, Congress' line drawing assumes a
universal definition of the word "physical," a term about which even
physicians are likely to disagree, much less courts and tax policy-
makers. Perhaps Congress should have recognized these interpretive
difficulties; after all, it felt compelled to provide language detailing the
treatment of emotional distress. Unless Congress revisits § 104(a)(2)
soon, these interpretive difficulties most assuredly will be the cause of
much judicial distress.
C. Amended Section 104(a)(2): Did Congress Go Far
Enough?
Congress' return of the personal injury exclusion to its physical ori-
gins necessitates a reexamination of the exclusion's theoretical under-
pinnings. Human capital theory has consistently provided the
foundational support for the exclusion, beginning with the Attorney
General's 1917 letter to the Secretary of the Treasury.231 This theory
has undergone significant modifications over the years in an effort to
accommodate competing tax policy. Nevertheless, it remains a struc-
turally unsound foundation for § 104(a)(2).
230. H.R. CoNF. REP. No. 104-737, at 301 (1996), reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1677,
1793.
231. S. 1384, 2 C.B. 71 (1920). See Cohen-Whelan, supra note 4, at 919 (stating that
"[tihe return to capital argument is the most popular income theory"). See also
Brooks, supra note 6, at 771-72; Dodge, supra note 4, at 147; Heen, supra note 4,
at 609; Harvey, supra note 4, at 317.
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As set forth in Part II, the application of human capital theory to
the personal injury exclusion began with the Attorney General's
flawed analysis linking accident insurance proceeds to a return of
human capital. 23 2 The Attorney General described the human body
as an investment in an accident insurance policy and urged exclusion
of the proceeds as a return of that human body investment.23 3 He
avoided cost basis limitations by employing Supreme Court decisions
addressing capital returns in a commercial context that utilized value,
rather than cost, as the appropriate measurement.234 A close reading
of the cases, however, reveals that the Attorney General
overreached.235
Any investment model of human capital theory must honor the ba-
sis requirement for gain and loss calculation. Needless to say, the
task of identifying costs associated with human capital formation is
difficult, if not impossible.23 6 What costs can be capitalized into the
basis of the wage-earning human body? Although food, education, and
health care costs also enhance or maintain the wage-earning capacity
of the individual, they are, for the most part, nondeductible personal
expenditures and therefore should not be added to basis.237 Most
such costs would be incurred entirely without regard to human pro-
ductive capability. Thus, for human capital theory to support
§ 104(a)(2), it must be expanded beyond traditional cost basis
analysis.
Professor Stephan advocates a deemed or assumed basis.238 He
defines human capital as the "present value of the flow of future satis-
factions that an individual can command in the course of his life" and
divides this value into two components, endowed capital and acquired
capital.239 He argues that individuals are endowed at birth with a
portion of their capital value, and it is appropriate to impute basis at a
date of birth value, analogizing to the fair market value date of death
basis provided in § 1014.240 With respect to the second human capital
component, acquired capital, Professor Stephan argues that one's
value is enhanced through education, job training, relocation to better
paying jobs, and health care. A basis in this acquired capital should
232. See supra note 28 and accompanying text.
233. See supra note 28 and accompanying text.
234. See supra notes 29-55 and accompanying text.
235. See supra notes 64-69 and accompanying text.
236. Dodge, supra note 4, at 151; Edward Yorio, The Taxation of Damages: Tax and
Non-Tax Policy Considerations, 62 ComRNLL L. Rlv. 701, 712 (1977).
237. Dodge, supra note 4, at 152.
238. Paul B. Stephan III, Federal Income Taxation and Human Capital, 70 VA. L. REv.
1357, 1390-92 (1984).
239. Id. at 1389.
240. Id. To avoid the political and moral dilemma of assigning basis according to one's
potential to create a future stream of earning, Professor Stephan suggests as-
signing a uniform basis for endowed capital. Id.
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be assumed, while the question as to the proper amount should be
postponed.241 He believes that the basis resulting from this combina-
tion of endowed capital and acquired capital sufficiently justifies the
exclusion of most personal injury recoveries. 242 And, while he does
recognize that mere substitutes for earnings should be taxed, he does
not provide any method for distinguishing between returns of as-
sumed basis and mere earnings replacements.
Professor Brooks, another proponent of human capital theory, cir-
cumvents these difficulties by proposing a rule that personal injury
payments should be excluded if they compensate for something the
taxpayer would have enjoyed tax free.2 43 Basis is not irrelevant for
Brooks, but she believes that whatever basis a taxpayer does have in
human capital is insufficient to justify a complete exclusion of per-
sonal injury awards.244 Instead, she argues that the excess above ba-
sis is excludable because it is a return of "nonincludable values."245
For example, in the case of an award for a lost limb, Professor Brooks
asserts that the tort recovery is not a substitute for income, but a re-
placement of the value of having the limb or being whole.246 In addi-
tion, she believes that some portion of the recovery should be
attributed to the imputed income of being free from injury; since this
imputed income is not taxed, neither should its replacement.247
In essence, Professor Brooks' argument is that unconverted human
capital is not taxed, so converted human capital also should not be
taxed. Professor Brooks also recognizes the replacement of earnings
dilemma, but states that rather than viewing lost earnings as income
substitutes, "it seems more correct to say that consideration of lost
future earnings is the only way to arrive at a reasonably accurate val-
uation of lost nonincludable values."24s
Professors Stephan and Brooks provide ingenious excuses for re-
taining an exclusion that has remained in the Code for eighty years.
It is unimaginable, however, that Congress would enact a personal
injury exclusion today under either justification. Neither approach
adequately confronts the problem of income substitutes. It may be
true that some portion of a recovery could be attributed to an assumed
241. Id. at 1392-93.
242. Id. Professor Stephan argues that most personal injury recoveries are for partial
liquidation of human capital and that if a basis-first recovery rule is adopted, the
full exclusion will produce very few errors.
243. Brooks, supra note 6, at 761.
244. Id. at 768.
245. Id. at 769-73.
246. Id. at 769-71.
247. Id. at 771. In applying her "income theory," Professor Brooks asserts that human
capital is taxable only when converted into monetary value through the perform-
ance of services for another. Id at 772.
248. Id. at 798.
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basis or to a replacement of nontaxable benefits; however, to a large
extent, such recoveries replace earnings that otherwise would be taxa-
ble. Complete exclusion simply is not justified under a Glenshaw
Glass definition of income.
Professor Dodge proposes a way around the basis/lost earning
dilemma.249 He argues that the human capital theory justifies
§ 104(a)(2) as long as no benefit accrues from the exclusion.250 He
supports an exclusion under § 104(a)(2) of the economic portion of per-
sonal injury awards (that portion meant to replace earning capacity),
but only if state tort law directs juries to calculate this portion of the
award net of taxes.251 If state tort policy fails to require a tax netting
adjustment, then the plaintiff has been overcompensated and Profes-
sor Dodge believes § 104(a)(2) is inappropriate. 252 This analysis as-
sumes that Congress did not intend to confer a benefit on the injured
party.2 53 While perhaps true, it is even more unlikely that the 1918
Congress intended to provide an exclusion for personal injury awards
as long as they were first subjected to the implicit tax provided by the
netting adjustment. Professor Dodge also urges taxing the
noneconomic portion of personal injury awards because these
amounts, by their nature, are not subject to a reduction for implicit
249. See Dodge, supra note 4.
250. Id. at 155. Dodge uses a financial analysis model with an underlying assumption
that the appropriate tax treatment is that which would "replicate what would
have occurred had there been no personal injury." Id.
251. Id. States currently are divided in requiring netting of taxes in calculating com-
pensatory damages. Some states hold that an instruction to a jury regarding the
consequences of the award is improper. See, e.g., Hansen v. Johns-Mansville
Prods. Corp., 734 F.2d 1036, 1045 (5th Cir. 1984); Canavin v. Pacific Southwest
Airlines, 196 Cal. Rptr. 82 (Cal. Ct. App. 1983); Sciola v. Shernow, 577 A.2d 1081
(Conn. App. Ct. 1990). Other states hold that an income tax instruction to a jury
is proper. See, e.g., Psychiatric Inst. of Wash. v. Allen, 509 A.2d 619, 627 (D.C.
1986); Fanetti v. Hellenic Lines, Ltd., 678 F.2d 424, 431 (2d Cir. 1982); Grant v.
City of Duluth, 672 F.2d 677 (8th Cir. 1982). In Federal actions under the Fed-
eral Tax Claims Act (FTCA), the federal courts have supported the deduction of
income taxes from damage awards in death cases, with the exception of Cinotta v.
United States, 362 F. Supp. 386 (D. Md. 1973). Federal courts have also allowed
income tax consideration for damage awards under FTCA in physical injury
cases, with the exception ofHuggins v. United States, 302 F. Supp. 114 (W.D. Mo.
1969). In cases involving Federal Employer's Liability Act (FELA), the United
States Supreme Court, in Norfolk & W. Ry. Co. v. Liepelt, 444 U.S. 490 (1980),
determined that the effect of income taxes should be considered in assessing dam-
ages for personal injuries. For a discussion of the netting and personal injury
awards, see Lawrence A. Frolik, The Convergence of .R.C. § 104(a)(2), Norfolk &
Western Railway Co. v. Liepelt and Structured Tort Settlements: Tax Policy 'De-
railed," 51 FoR)HAM L. Rav. 565 (1983).
252. Dodge, supra note 4, at 160.
253. Id. at 161. Professor Dodge asserts that if Congress did intend to provide a bene-
fit, it acted "arbitrarily by awarding plaintiffs who receive recoveries, while pre-
cluding loss deduction for nonrecovering injured parties." Id. at 148-49.
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tax.2 54 In sum, Professor Dodge supports an exclusion under
§ 104(a)(2) only if the exclusion is limited to the compensatory portion
of an award, and only in the event juries calculate the award net of
tax.
Professor Dodge's view does not survive further analysis. He ar-
gues that amounts received for lost earning capacity should be exempt
from actual taxation, but only if subjected to implicit taxation. All
other amounts received for personal injury should be subjected to ac-
tual taxation. But if the entire award should be subjected to some
form of taxation, then why provide an exclusion? Moreover, if, as Pro-
fessor Dodge suggests, the noneconomic portion of a recovery merits
actual taxation, then certainly the economic portion should also be
subject to an actual, and not an implicit, tax.
Perhaps the litmus test for exclusions based upon human capital
theory should be whether it would convince Congress to create a per-
sonal injury exclusion out of whole cloth. It is difficult to imagine
deemed basis theory or implicit tax theory providing such motivation.
Certainly, the sympathy theory of exclusion seems more defensible.255
It must be remembered, however, that any proposed justification for a
personal injury exclusion must be measured against the Glenshaw
Glass definition of income. It does not depend on whether all or a por-
tion of the award can be characterized as an earning substitute or a
capital substitute; it simply depends on whether the injured party has
acceded to wealth. If this is the test, then the answer to the question,
did Congress go far enough, is clearly no. Section 104(a)(2) should
have been repealed.
IV. CONCLUSION
The 1996 amendments to § 104(a)(2) reveal an unwillingness by
Congress to take a hard look at the personal injury exclusion. It was
accepted in the Code as a result of a suspect human capital theory
partly founded on a now obsolete definition of income. The exclusion
should have been limited to physical injuries and sickness, but was
soon merged with a judicially created exclusion for nonphysical inju-
ries, also based on the outdated notion of income. As a result of the
1996 amendments, Congress has returned the statutory exclusion to
its physical limits. The new statute, however, is fraught with inter-
254. Id. at 161.
255. See Bertram Harnett, Torts and Taxes, 27 N.Y.U. L. REV. 614, 627 (1952)(stating
that the victim of a personal injury should be pitied, not taxed, and the taxing of
recoveries for pain and suffering is offensive). See also Cohen-Whelan, supra note
4, at 925 (suggesting that the humanitarian approach to taxation makes sense
only when applied to actual physical injury such as a loss of limb); Harvey, supra
note 4, at 351 (commenting that the personal injury exclusion provision of
§ 104(aX2) evidences the sympathy of legislators).
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pretive difficulties likely to plague courts for some time. In addition,
the legislative history reveals that, once again, Congress has failed to
reexamine the theoretical justification for having an exclusion for per-
sonal injury recoveries. If Congress had undertaken such a review,
Congress would have been convinced that the only appropriate legisla-
tive response was complete repeal.
